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Dying! In the streets of London, the last horse-
bus clattered towards extinction. The aeroplane, 
that incongruous object, earthbound and wavering, 
still called forth exclamations of rapture and 
alarm. Country roads, with blind corners and pre-
cipitous inclines, took a last revenge upon the 
loud invading automobile. There was talk of wild 
young people in London, more wild and less witty 
than you would ever guess from the novels of Saki; 
of night clubs; of negroid dances. People gazed in 
horror at the paintings of Gauguin, and listened 
with a delighted alarm to the barbaric measures of 
Stravinsky. The old order, the old bland world was 
dying fast: .... 
(George Dangerfield. The Strange Death of Liberal England) 
Lord George Rankin Askwith , the tireless sage of the 
Board of Trade, addressed a meeting of the Cavendish Club at 
Bristol in November of 1913. During his talk, Askwith observed 
that throughout his recent travels as an arbitrator of indus-
trial strikes, he had noticed 
... a spirit abroad of unrest, of movement, a 
spirit and a desire of improvement, of alteration . 
We are in, perhaps, as quick an age of transition 
as there has been for many generations past ... We 
quicken day by day means of transport ... tramways, 
railways, motors ... (The working-man has achieved) 
political equality rand) he is far more anxious 
to achieve a greater amount of economic equality ... 
By newspapers, by magazines, by books, the work-
people are self-educating themselves far more than 
they ever did a score of years ago ... That the pre-
sent unrest will cease I do not believe for one 
moment; it will increase, and probably increase 
2 
with greater force . 1 
Within six months, England and the rest of Europe had plummeted 
into World War I, the watershed of the modern world. This war 
dramatically altered the composition of European society . 
The pervasive influence that the Great War had on Europe was 
such that most people viewed the years leading up to 1914 as 
I 
"La Belle Epo~'. Yet, the decade prece- ding the Great War 
was also tumultuous. Dangerfield and Askwith were both acutely 
aware of a new order being formed before the war. The years 
after 1900 in England were filled with imperceptible and subtle 
transitions; evolutionary changes; and the explosions of near-
revolution which rocked Britain especially in the years 1910-14 . 
In the twenty-five years before the Great War, the life 
of the British worker underwent a series of important changes 
which gradually began to alter his view of the world. The 
startling growth of education, added leisure time, and the 
improvement in technology (especially in communications) had 
altered the worker's conception of the world, so that it no 
longer was confined to local and private interests. The 
strikes of 1889 and the beginning of an independent Labour 
movement in the early l '8.g,o-s attest to the labourer's new view 
of himself and his place in society. This radically different 
view was slow to grow. Thus, the strength of Labour politi-
cally and industrially did not become truly evident until 
after 1906. However, after the Boer War , the economic prosperity 
1George Askwith, Industrial Problems and Disputes (London : 
John Murray, 1920), pp. 348-49 . 
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and stability that the wage-earner had known was superseded 
by inflation and stationary wages. Expectations and desires , 
both products of education were further heightened by the more 
pronounced surface characteristics of the age. 
England was a country of great wealth, and inequality had 
long been ingrained within the fabric of society. The growing 
consciousness of the worker was accentuated by the late Vic-
torian and Edwardian affinity for great shows of wealth . The 
late nineteenth century was one of the most ostentatious and 
extravagant periods ever known. All the worker had to do 
was look around him to feel alienated from 'mainstream' England . 
In 1891, Lloyd George, then an obscure Welsh M.P . grasped the 
contradictions of English society in a speech in Bangor, S. Wales . 
The most startling fact about our country is this-
that you have men who have accumulated untold wealth 
living in gorgeous splendour in one street and a 
horde of miserable, poverty-stricken human beings 
huddled together in the most abject penury and squa-
lor in the adjoining courts. Incalc~ble wealth 
and indescribable poverty dwell side by side. 2 
At the same time, the nineteenth century's ideological 
conception of the individual's place in society was changing . 
The powerful individualism of John Stuart Mill had been joined 
with a more ethical view of man. The connection was forged 
by the flowering of socialism, idealism, and the new evolu-
tionary theories of society put forth by a more empirically 
oriented scientific community. The Victorian stigma of the 
Poor Laws was slowly giving way to the realization that society 
was also to blame for the individual ' s condition. Society 
2Martin Gilbert, Lloyd George (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice Hall Inc., 1968), p. 29 . 
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had to take moral responsibility for its members for the good 
of the organic whole. Thus, a "New Liberalism" grew in intellec-
tual circles after 1900 which was best illustrated in the 
writings of J . A. Hobson and L . T. Hobhouse . 
This new intellectual Liberalism was translated into 
policy after 1908 under the great Liberal government of Henry 
Herbert Asquith , Lloyd George, and Winston Churchill . A gra-
dual trend away from the more traditional Gladstonian issues 
of the late nineteenth century had been taking place since 
Harcourt ' s death duties of the 1890s. Nonconformity, Home 
Rule for Ireland, drink, and education were no longer the 
rallying cries of the Liberal Party after 1906 . Yet, it s hould 
be noted that 1906 was unique as it brought together all of 
these traditional issues in one mammoth electoral victory. 
But this election was an anomaly and was mainly a reaction 
against an utterly equivocal Tory Party of the early 1900s. 
1906 should be viewed as the last gasp of the party of Gladstone . 
In particular, after the budget of 1909 , the electoral focus 
was on aomore economic plane as the necessity to appeal to 
the people became evident. Though the battle over the Lords 
can be construed as an opportunity for revenge against Tory 
emmasculation of Liberal legislation from 1906 to 1908, the 
struggle was primarily over Lloyd George's "socialistic" budget . 
1910 was the cardinal point for a new revolutionary spirit 
in England. George Dangerfield based his book on a series 
of events which shook the roots of England from 1910 to 1914. 
Specifically, he focused on the industrial unrest , the suffra-
5 
gette movement, and the Irish problem as symbolic of the end 
of an age of respectability and elitist control. In the Labour 
movement, Dangerfield examined the revolutionary syndicalist 
influence on the trade union movement. Spontaneity and dis -
respect for the older union leaders were symptomatic of these 
strikes . The W.S.P.U. (Women's Social and Political Union) by 
1910 had taken up arson as a tactic. In Ireland, the Ulstermen 
under Carson were preparing for a Civil War aided and abetted 
by Bonar Law and the Cpnservative Party . The common denomi-
nator in all of these crises was the incompetence and inability 
of the Liberal Party to provide effective solutions to these 
new and different rebellions. Thus, Dangerfield concluded 
that not only was Liberal England (Liberal in the sense of 
Victorian England) in its death throes, but the Liberal Party , 
the symbol of nineteenth century England would be swept away 
a l ong with its era. 3 This assertion began the avalanche of 
literature addressed to the demise of the Liberal Party. 
In 1906, the Liberal Party was victorious in the largest 
landslide in English political history . On the eve of World 
War I, the Liberals were in control of 261 seats in the Commons. 
By 1924, this total had fallen to 43; approximately the same 
number that the Labour Party had held in 1910. The Liberals 
were never again to be more than a third party in British 
politics . This remarkable phenomenon has fascinated scholars 
for some forty years . 
3George Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England " 
(New York; Capricorn Books, 1961) . 
) 
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In general, two interpretations have taken hold as expla-
nations for the political catastrophe that befell the party 
of Lloyd George and Asquith. The so - called "inevitablist" 
school was inspired by Danger:'field' s The Stragge Death of 
Liberal England which argued that 1910 to 1914 saw the end of 
the Gilbertian age in England, socially, economically and 
politically. There was a spirit of rewolt and the Liberal 
Party was not able to adjust to a new era in English history . 
The party was for all intents and purposes dead by 1914 and 
World War I served as Gabriel ' s horn. As the years have passed 
since Stran~ Death, a more sophisticated "inevitablist" argu -
ment has evolved, best represented by Ross McKibbin's The Evo-
lution of !he Labour Part~. He argues that working class 
consciousness was growing before the war. McKibbin then examines 
the internal evolution of the structure of the Labour Party 
in the years 1910 to 1924. From these two points , he goes 
on to extrapolate from 1914 to the franchise bill of 1918, 
claiming the inevitability of the victory of Labour. In recent 
years the "inevitablist" position has been strongly discredited . 
The so-called "accidentalists" have been in the vanguard 
of recent years in the debate. The major spokesmen for this 
interpretation are P.F. Clarke and Trevor Wilson . These his -
torians look to World War I as the true cause of the Liberal ' s 
death. Clarke in particular focuses on the elections and 
by-elections of 1910 to 1914. He shows persuasively that the 
Liberal Party's support was not eroding. In fact, the Liberals 
had shed their middle-class ideology . A "New Liberalism" had 
7 
evolved during this period and the Liberals were very active 
in the area o£ social re£orm. In Lancashire and the New 
Liberalism, Clarke argues that the Liberals had not only 
adapted ideologically to new pressures, but had indeed gained 
a new working class constituency in the Northwest. It seemed 
as i£ the party was healthier than ever. But then World War 
I intervened, splitting the party and thus killing it. 
What is the purpose o£ writing a paper on a question 
which many scholars have considered solved? This topic's most 
recent investigators have only had to elaborate on its sub-
stance and ·i.,) neaten its structure . The purpose o£ this paper 
is to reopen this Pandora ' s Box o£ historians' nightmares . 
The truth o£ history does not lie in the insipid structure o£ 
election results which at best reveal the sur£ace; yet never 
reach the depths o£ the essence. This paper proposes that 
history is not neat. It is a constant stream o£ contradic-
tions especially in as transitional a period as 1910 to 1914. 
A period o£ transition by de£inition entails the interac -
tion o£ the old and new. Because there are new issues being 
discussed does not mean the old ones are unimportant and 
ignored. At times the old will £ight the new. At other times 
the old will in£luence the new in such a way as to form a 
quali£ied new £orce. All of these combinations pervaded the 
period 1910 to 1914. 
The years 1910 to 1914 have been isolated be£ore in 
Danger£ield's impressionistic interpretation. Yet, this semi -
nal work only scratches the sur£ace of a period teeming with 
changes. Thus , the primary rationale for scrutinizing the 
period 1910 to 1914 is that it saw the cUlmination of many 
dramatic and rapid changes that had been brewing for over a 
decade. Our inquiry is the effect that this transition had 
8 
on politics with an emphasis on the Liberal-Labour controversy . 
However, the lever used to gain a~ to this political system 
is not the typical angle of entry . It is crucial to understand 
that politics does not operate in a vacuum, but in a given 
social context. To truly understand the dynamics of a political 
situation, it is first necessary to examine all facets of 
the "political system". Thus, this paper takes a bottom-up 
view of antebellum England. 
The first chapter deals with the underlying trends of 
the period. At first the material conditions of the first 
decade of the twentieth century will be assessed. What was 
the economic condition of the people? How was this position 
colored by the levels of relative deprivation, education, and 
leisure time that existed in Edwardian England? Once these 
basic areas have been examined, chapter one goes on to trace 
the development known as the "New Unionism" which began taking 
root after 1889 and really found its place after 1910. What 
was the nature of this unionism and what made it different from 
its predecessor? We will briefly look at the disputes of 
the period and their importance to a growing workers' consci-
ousness. This topic of consciousness-will then be viewed within 
the framework of the earlier part of this chapter. The final 
section will then make the bridge to politics as it briefly 
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examines the political ramifications of the "New Unionism". 
Chapter two concentrates on the parliamentary Labour 
Party. In tracing the early development of Labour, emphasis 
will be placed on the multitude of constraints and liabilities 
that the party encountered from 1900 to 1914. Areas covered 
will include internal weaknesses , the relationship with trade 
unions, and external constraints ( i.e. the Liberal Party, 
the constraints of the political system, etc.) . The second 
part of the chapter will examine the growth of the Labour 
Party from 1910 to 1914. Not only will the evolution of the 
structure,-:-61' the party be assessed but the general political 
picture from the perspective of Labour a s of 1914 will be 
examined. 
The last chapter will scrutini ze the actual position of 
the Liberal Party in the years 1910 to 1914 with an emphasis 
on the oft-overlooked question of municipal elections. Some 
may ask after the author ' s earlier attempts at discrediting 
purely empirical studies why he ends up doing the same. The 
reason is to show how misleading electoral study can be . For 
at the national level , the Liberals will be seen to be strong 
while Labour appears inept and at bay. Municipal results 
reveal quite a different picture. After this section, a 
conclusion will attempt to draw this eclectb~ approach into 
a sfungle cohesive statement of ililtent. 
It is important to include a warning for the reader . 
There has been an immense amount of material written on this 
topic and it is impossible to ignore this vast corpus of scho -
10 
larship in any examination o£ the area in question. Thus , 
when possible, many o£ the traditional questions and problems 
o£ the historiography will be addressed directly. In parti-
cular, P.F. Clarke's work will be reacted to. 
This paper has purposely avoided discussing the £oreign 
matters o£ the day. There is no doubt that these a££airs 
were on peoples ' minds . Yet, it is di££icult to say what i£ 
any e££ect they had on the political system. The "German 
Problem" can o£ course be considered as another burden on 
the Liberal government. Along with the constitutional crises 
of the day, it constrained the actions o£ all political parties . 
Another caution need be given and that is to beware the 
line and tone that this interpretation takes. Without looking 
at the body o£ this paper, one might surmise that a new "inevi -
tablist" argument is being put £orth which has the Labour 
Party replacing the Liberals by 1914. This is not the thrust 
o£ this essay. The paper will be worded cautiously in order 
to prevent such an argument £rom COIning £orth. The purpose 
of the £irst three chapters is not to give easy answers to 
several di££icult questions. The growth o£ trade unionism 
£rom 1910 to 1914 does not necessarily connote a proportional 
growth £inancially and spiritually in the Labour Party. Nor 
does the fracturing o£ Lib-Labism after 1910 mean that Ramsay 
MacDonald was not going to try and renegotiate an electoral 
pact with the Liberals for a possible 1915 General Election. 
Because Liberalism was weakening locally in areas where it 
had been strong for many years does no t reveal an irreversible 
.) 
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trend. Thus, it must be said that the true aim of this paper 
is not to provide answers, but to stimulate new questions. 
A final definitive solution to the controversy over the Liberal 
Party will not be found within these pages. For a resolution . 
one will have to take the advice of the Right Honourable H.H. 
Asquith and simply "wait and see " . The wait might last to 
eternity . 
CHAPTER I 
1886-1914: THE UPHEAVAL 
In 1910-a year of record trade-wages remained prac-
tically stationary. The cost of lyving increases, 
and the working people's desires rightly grow. But 
with stationary wages, the real condition of the 
workers is one of diminishing power to satisfy de-
sires. This is one of the causes of the unrest in 
the Labour world. With the spread of education, 
with the display of wealth and luxury by the rich 
it is certain that the workers will not be content •. 
If employers and politicians are so unwise as to ig-
nore the demands of Labour, then what might be done 
by safe constitutional methods will, by great suffer-
ing and loss, be accomplished by industrial strife, 
and through social anarchy. 
(Philip Viscount Snowden) 
The most salient feature of British politics during the 
period 1886 to 1914 was the stunning rise to power of the 
working class. Before this time (1906 in particular), the 
proletariat had been only one (though an important one) of 
many interest groups in British politics. Though potentially 
preponderant in number, the British worker had been strangely 
absent from the political scene. Yet, after 18861 , he suddenly 
11886 is a traditional historical demarcation in British 
history. The Liberal Party split over Irish Home Rule and it 
was from about this date that working class movements began to 
enjoy more than parochial popularity. 
12 
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awakened from a long and relatively tranquil slumber . Pre-
viously, the wage-earner had made occasional forays into the 
political arena, only to be mollified and returned to his 
proper place in society. But after 1886, he entered the poli-
tical forum in such a way as to decisively and permanently 
alter the entire framework of the British electoral system. 
It is the purpose of this chapter to describe the sometimes 
subtle and sometimes cataclysmic process by which the working 
class established itself as the single most important force 
in British politics . 
The "Quiet" Revolution 
While on the campaign trail during the General Election 
of 1906, Lloyd George exclaimed: 
I believe there is a new order coming from the 
people of this country. It is a quiet, but cer-
tain revolution as revolutions come in a constitu-
tional country.2 
Ll oyd George\~ observation was quite correct . Indeed, there 
had been a quiet revolution occurring within the working class 
since 1886 . The causes of this transformation were concisely 
stated in the epigraph to this chapter. This section of the 
chapter will seek to expand on Snowden ' s observations and 
provide documentation that will explain exactly why this 
revolution occurred. 
In 1899, Seebohm Rowntree in his famous study of York , 
wrote that forty per cent of all urban wage-earners and their 
2Colin Cross, The Liberals in Power (London: Barrie and 
Rackliff with Pall Mall Press, 1903), p. 20. 
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families were living in poverty . Poverty was defined as the 
inability to buy "the minimum of food, clothing, and shelter 
needful for maintenance of merely physical health.") Rowntree 
went on to spell out what "merely phY'sical efficiency" (the 
subsistence level) was. 
A family living upon the scale allowed for in this 
estimate must never spend a penny on· railway fare 
or omnibus. They must never go into the country 
unless they walk. They must never purchase a half -
penny newspaper or spend a penny to buy a ticket 
for a popular concert. They must write no letters 
to absent children, for they cannot afford to pay 
the postage. They must never contribute anything 
to their church or chapel, or give any help to a 
neighbor which costs them money. They cannot save, 
nor can they join sick club or Trade Union, because 
they cannot pay the necessary subscriptions. The 
children must have no pocket money for dolls, mar-
bles, or sweets. The father must smoke no tobacco, 
and must drink no beer. The mother must never buy 
any pretty clothes for herself or for her children. -. 
Should a child fall ill, it must be attended by the 
parish doctor; should it die, it must be buried by 
the parish. Finally, the wage-earner ~ust never be 
absent from his work for a single day.4 
Rowntree's findings were not peculiar to York . Studies con-
ducted by Charles Booth in London (1887-92) and Bowley and 
Burnett-Hurst in Northampton, Warrington, Stanley, and Reading 
(1912 and 1913) all closely agreed with Rowntree's pathetic 
conclusions. 5 Poverty had long been ingrained within the 
fabric of British life. Yet , the surveys conducted by Rown-
tree and Booth in particular revealed for the first time in 
3E.H. Phelps Brown, The Growth of British Industrial 
Relations (London: MacMi~lan & Co. Ltd., 1959), p. 25. 




print what had been virtually ignored for hundreds of years . 
The realization by intellectuals of the depths of despair that 
the worker endured helped spur on an ideological revolution 
leading to both a "New Liberalism" and the growth of socialism . 
These developments will not be scrutinized here. Instead, 
our interest will focus on the worker. If conditions of squa-
lor had existed for many years, why was it that it was only 
in the late-Victorian period that the worker finally became 
aware of his predicament? 
Historically, English wage-earners had become aroused 
at certain times to correct specific wrongs . Certainly the 
heroic struggles of such groups as the Diggers, the Luddites, 
and the Chartists should not be overlooked. Yet, the common 
man of the late 1800s underwent a different process than his 
predecessors, thanks to the remarkable growth in education. 
In 1870, an Act was passed which set up the School Boards 
to fill gaps between voluntary schools . Within six years , a 
million and a half new pupils were offered slots in school . 
Along with this numerical growth was the general improvement 
of teaching quality as the amount of teachers per student 
dramatically increased throughout the period. The Balfour 
Act of 1902 was directed at developing secondary education . 
Responsibility for these sehools was placed squarely on the 
shoulders of the countyycouncils and by 1907, the grant-aided 
secondary schools were required to give not less than a quarter 
of'their spots to free place scholars from elementary schools . 
. , 
The effect of the 1870 Act on elementary schools and the 1902 
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Act on secondary schools is most viviliily shown in the f'ollowing 
f'igures . 
Estimated proportion of' the population of' London 
within the ages 25-55 who at the date shown had 









These statistics are probably accurate f'or all of' England . 7 
From 1891 to 1911, the number of' people who had completed 
basic work in reading, writing, and arithmetic quantum-leaped 
an astounding 55%! The importance of' this phenomenon cannot 
be overstated. More than any other development of' this period, 
the growth in education and thus literacy marked the late-
Victorian worker of'f' f'rom any of' his predecessors. Bef'ore 
to f'irst examine several other critical developments and cha-
racteristics of' this period. 
The second major inf'luence on the worker was the general 
reduction in the work week. A brief' examination of' f'our of' 
the major industries will reveal a general trend towards a 
new and unheard of' luxury f'or the working class; leisure time. 
In 1874, there V;~ general reduction of' hours worked in the 
~f'extile industry f'rom sixty to f'if'ty-six and a half'. By 1902 , 
another hour had been eliminated f'rom the work week. Similarly, 
6Brown, p. 45. 
7Ibid . 
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the Building industry saw a reduction in 1860 from sixty to 
fifty-six and a half hours worked a week. Four more hours had 
been removed from the work schedule by 1873 and in 1893, the 
work week stood at an even fifty hours. The Engineering trade 
received a reduction of six hours in 1871 from sixty to fifty-
four · hours worked per week. Finally, in the Coal industry, 
the miners were granted the eight hour day in 1909 by an Act 
of Parliament. 8 Thus, by 1909, the miserable drudgery of 
industrial labour had been somewhat eased by a general reduc-
tion in the work week from about sixty hours to anywhere from 
forty-eight to fifty-five. The question that naturally arises 
is what the worker would do with this new and totally alien 
phenomenon of leisure time? 
Yet another interesting feature of late-Victorian England 
was the cUlmination of several trends which all overlapped 
at the same time. In the areas of technology, education, 
ideology, and social habits (some of these were results of 
each other), certain developments which had been brewing for 
years all reached fruition at the same time and helped cause 
this "quiet" revolution. It was just during this period that 
many advances in technology were being felt by the common 
worker for the first time. The electric motor in particular 
began to .make its presence felt in the factory . Electricity 
brought together many scattered small workrooms under one 
roof. This wa;sa major reason for a 50% increase in the number 
of factories from 1895 to 1913. In addition , between 1870 and 
8A.L. Bowley, Wages and Income in the United Kingdom Since 
1860 (Cambridge: C.D.P., 1937), pp . 25-26 . 
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1914, the amount of equipment per man doubled . 9 Specializa-
tion in the different stages of making a product had been 
noted years before by Adam Smith. Yet, this mechanization 
and increasing alienation of the worker from the total product 
was intensifying throughout this period of constant innovation . 
The dehumanization caused by the modern f actory was more and 
more evident during these years. The vivid descriptions by 
Marx in Das Kapital or the tragi-comic vision of a Charlie 
Chaplin in "Modern Times" are exemplary and poignant illus -
trations of the utter degradation that the worker in a modern 
industrial state suffered, as he became but a cog in a vast 
network of machinery. As George Askwith, the foremost arbi -
trator of the Board of Trade I1>u t it: "The workmen become 
numbers, grouped on processes, driven into pigeon-holes . .. ". 10 
One of the by-products of the growth of technology was 
the development in communication. In particular, newspapers 
were more easily accessible than ever before. The tremendous 
outpouring of propaganda by the newly imported Syndicalist 
movement and revamped socialist movements found its way into 
the workers ' hands for the first time. Mann's The Syndicalist , 
The Miner's Next Step, Blatchford's Clarion, Champion's Labour 
Elector, Keir Hardie's Labour Leader, the Workman's Times, 
the Cotton Factory Times, the Yorkshire Factory Times, the 
S.D.F. 's periodical, Justice , Money ' s Riches and Poverty, not 
9Brown, p. 90. 
1 0Askwith, p. 16. 
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to mention Fabian tracts and Rowntree ' s and Booth's surveys 
all appeared in the years 1886 to 1900 . Between 1900 and 1910, 
benefactions of Andrew Carnegie began, and led to the opening 
of some 900 municipal libraries. The worker was now not only 
able to read, but had the time and opportunity to do it . For 
the first time, the workingman was able to step back from his 
life and realiliy look at it. Askwith understood this quiet 
revolution. He noted thatl 
Education and self-education had been going on 
more and more rapidly for years before. More 
and more young people were being turned out into 
the world with better knowledge of books and wider 
aspirations than their grandfathers had, but with 
no equal speed had a right to start or opportuni-
ties for advancement or any s~stem giving them a 
return for their efforts been opened up. Can any-
one be surprised that the various forms of propa-
ganda find adherents?ll 
Perhaps the most ironic trend of the era which colored 
this new worker's perception was the nature of the society 
around him. For one of the major aids in this process of a 
growing consciousness was the realization of the vast physi-
cal difference between himself and late-Victorian and Edwardian 
society. Despite the failure of the Boer War, England was at 
the apex of its colonial power . The country had never been 
more prosperous and inequality in the sharing of this wealth 
could be seen with the naked eye. The difference in dress 
was obvious. It is not an overstatement to say that most 
workers lived in ghettos. Yet, the extremity of this inequality 
was most evidenced by the actions of the rich. "Victorian 
11Askwith, p. 296 . 
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reticence in the display of wealth had given way to conspi -
cuous expenditure in restaurants, hotels and above all, in 
the country houses of the rich.,,12 The symbol of gaudiness 
20 
was the King himself, Edward VII . Edward was the picture of 
opulence. In fact: 
Edwardian society modelled itself to suit the 
King's personal demands. Everything was larger 
than lifesize. There was an avalanche of balls and 
dinners and country house parties. More money was 
spent on clothes, more food was consumed, more 
horses were raced, more infidelities were committed, 
more birds were shot, more yachts were commissioned, 
more late hours were kept, than ever before. It 
was, in short, the most ostentatious and extrava-
gant decade that England had ever known. 13 
If this quotation conveys an image of hedonism, it has served 
its purpose well. Though it is difficult to prove these 
generalizations, there is little doubt that people of the 
time viewed the rich in this manner. An examination of C.F.G . 
Masterman's (a minister in Asquith's cabinet) The Condition 
of England will confirm this description of the rich. 
While it is difficult to grapple with as ambiguous a 
concept as consciousness, the developments traced in the pre-
vious pages must necessarily lead one to the co'nclusion that 
a new awareness would grow on the part of the worker. The 
workingman who lived during the twenty-five years before World 
War I underwent a radical transformation in outlook. New 
aspirations were growing as the wage-earner became better 
educated. Yet these desires were bound to be frustrated. The 
l~Cross, p. 137. 
13James Laver, Edwardian Promenade (London, Edward HUl -
ton, 1958), p. 1 7 . 
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worker began to realize that he was in some sense socially 
different and that this was unjust. The opulence of the period 
confirmed the fact that his interests, desires , and life styles 
were peculiarly his own. Such outbursts as the strikes of 
1889 , the formation of the Social Democratic Federation and 
the Independent Labour Party were the first signs of this 
new perception. However, the period this paper addresses i is 
1910 to 1914. For this reason it is important to examine 
how this new consciousness became s visible after 1900. Thus , 
this new consciousness must be looked at against the background 
of the actual economic conditions of the period. 
* The Economy and the People 
From 1910 to 1914, England underwent the most tumultuous 
period of internal industrial F-ebellion it had ever known. 
The number of strikes and work days lost in these years was 
staggering . There had been periods of unrest before; but 
never to the extent or degree of the period in question. What 
made the strike wave of 1910-14 different from the one in 1889 
or any other period of social upheaval in British history? 
The first part of this chapter developed several reasons 
and causes for the rise of a new worker. Most of this argu-
ment dealt with broad trends and influences. With this in 
mind, it is important to deal with some of the constraints on 
*This section is but an excerpt from a much larger and 
more detailed economic analysis found in Appendix A. It is 
strongly emphasized that those interested in termonology and 
methodology consult the Appendix before reading this section . 
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this new spirit be£ore going on to the economic £igures. Per-
haps the most important was the historic nature o£ the British 
worker and in particular, his view towards his country. England 
had historically been the symbol of how the "system" could 
adapt to changes in the make-up of society. Since 1688, 
England had been a model of government by consent. There 
was a real pride in the unwritten constitution and in parlia-
ment. While the rest of Europe was undergoing the upheavals 
o£ the post-Napoleonic period and revolutions of 1848, the 
Parliament o£ England was passing the great Re£orm Bill of 
1832. The British worker was proud of his country and the 
empire . Radical Englishmen were more influenced by the wri -
tings o£ John Stuart Mill than by those of Karl Marx .14 It 
is little wonder that such groups as the S.D.F. and other 
more utopian Marxist groups found £ew adherents in Britain . 15 
Instead, the new class consciousness engendered by the growth 
in education, reduction in the work week, and advances in 
technology must be understood against the background of a 
worker who was £iercely patriotic and adamantly opposed to 
revolution. Thus, this consciousness was focused on very 
specific and realistic demands. An examination of revolu-
tionary Syndicalism or Marxism will not reveal the true causes 
of the unrest of this era. 16 
14Michael Freeden, The New Liberali,sm (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press ,1978), pp. 2)-27· - -
15Althoughthe S.D.F. exercised little national power, 
it was quite influential in London. 
16See E . J. Hobsbawm, Labouring Men (London: Weiden£eld 
and Nicolson, 1964), chapters 12, 15, and 16 . 
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Be£ore going on to discuss the economic conditions o£ 
England, it is important to clari£y the intent o£ this section . 
A period o£ transition contains both aspects o£ the old and 
new. The economic trends about to be analyzed are not all 
new phenomena to the British scene. What makes them important 
is how they combined with some o£ the newer trends to heighten 
the sensitivity o£ the working class to its own condition . 
Thus, some o£ the traditional causes o£ worker unrest are as 
operative in the period 1910 to 1914 as they were at earlier 
timesin British history (e.g ., high employment and stagnant 
wages) . 
The most important aspect o£ the economic figures o£ 
the £irst decade o£ the twentieth century to consider is how 
they compared with those numbers o£ the years immediately 
previous. For the £irst time in some £i£ty years, nominal 
wages were lagging behind prices. To bring this phenomenon 
into perspective it is necessary to examine three measurements . 
The course o£ the nominal wage, the real wage, and the cost 
o£ living will there£ore be scrutinized . Q£ course , these T 
three measurements are dependent upon one another. But it 
is most convenient and help£ul to examine them individually. 
From 1900 to 1910, the nominal wage (what the worker took 
home each week) hovered around the same average £igure. In 
£act, it took ten years £or the nominal wage to stabilize at 





















SOURCEIA.L. Bowley, Wages and Income Since 1880, p. 6. 
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The figures from 1910 to 1914 showed a rise of eight points. 
The period has been generally characterized as one of wage 
stagnation . The Board of Trade described the period as one 
of a "slight upward movement in wages ... (which) did not become 
at anytime marked. ,,17 In fact, the largest jump between 1911 
and 1912 was due almost solely to the Miners Minimum Wage Act 
of 1912. 
The nominal wage alone only reveals that wages were not 
improving very much. It is even more revealing when this 
wage is compared with the cost of living (the cost of food , 
rent, clothing, fuel, etc.). For this figure gives the best 
insight into the workingman ' s economic condition . Basically, 
the cost of living can be tabulated by averaging the course 
of a budget of expenditure from year to year. By dividing 
the nominal wage by this figure, one will find the real wage . 
The real wage reveals what the buying power of the worker 
really was and is thus the best measurement available for 
figuring out the actual eyonomic condition of the wage-earner . 
17Board of Trade Labbur Gazette ( January , 1911), p . 3 . 
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Table 2 
Year Nominal N Cost of Living Real Wage 
1900 94 91 103 
1901 93 90 102 
1902 91 90 101 
1903 91 91 99 
1904 89 92 97 
1905 89 92 97 
1906 91 93 98 
1907 96 95 101 
1908 94 93 101 
1909 94 94 100 
1910 94 96 98 
1911 95 97 97 
1912 98 100 97 
1913 99 102 97 
(1914 ) (100) (100) (100)=W.W. 
SOURCE:A.L. Bowley, p. 30. 
The real wage was very stationary throughout the period, and 
the 1913 figure was actually six points less than in 1900. 
Pe-rhaps even more illuminating is the fact that the retail 
price of food jumped 15% between 1900 and 1913 as compared to 
a rise in wages of 8%.18 
Another important statistic to examine is the unemploy-
ment figure. The greatest amount of union recruitment had 
always occurred during periods of high employment. 19 1910 














18Board of Trade Labour Gazette (January, 1915), p. 4. 
19Henry Pelling, . Popular Politics and Society in Late 





















SOURCE:Henry Pelling,Popular Politics, p. 149. 
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1910 to 1914 saw great union activity during a period of high 
employment. This was due to a worker who was more confident 
about his future and felt he could risk joining a union. The 
chance of scab labourers replacing union men was less during 
a period of high employment. Workers had greater leverage 
during periods when industry needed them. The other two t most 
recent periods of union and strike activity came in 1888-91 
and 1896-1901 which were also periods of high employment ( though 
the latter period of activity was muted by patriotic fervor 
for the Boer War). A comparison with earlier numbers is also 
helpful in putting the real wage into perspective. For in 
the fifteen years before 1900, nominal wages had been consis-
tently rising at a faster rate than the cost of living. 
One f fu nal question to ask of the economic statistics is 
what was the wage-earner's share in the total GNP? For over 
forty years, the wage-earner who made up approximately 75-80% 
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SOURCE: Cambridge Economic History of' Europe, Vol. 7, part. 1, p . 1 68 . 
This table shows a declining percentage o£ the work£orce ear-
ning a consistent percentage o£ the GNP. Thus, it would seem 
that the wage-earner was actually improving his position. But 
this is misleading. These are aggregative £igures which ob-
scure certain distributive anomalies (e.g. skilled and white-
collar occupations were improving their position and they are 
c l assed as wage-earners ) within the wage sector. The more 
obvious £act is that three-quarters o£ the population was 
earning only £orty per cent o£ the GNP (i.e. twenty-£ive per 
cent o£ the population earns sixty per cent o£ the GNP). 
Thus, there was no signi£icant improvement in the wage-earner ' s 
lot. Inequality was as pervasive during this period o£ un-
paralleled national prosperity as at any other time. 20 
The most important in£luence on the £igures examined so 
£ar was the Coal Industry. Like Table 4, the aggregate wage 
. 20From 1900 to 1913, the net national income o£ the Uni -
ted Kingdom jumped by over .500 mill~on pounds or 30%. Indus -
trial production increased by 16 . .5%. S·ee David Butler and 
Jennie Freeman, British Political Facts: 1200-1960 (New York: 
St . Martin ' s Press Inc., 1963), p. 221. 
) 
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table also obscures certain distributive anomalies. The Coal 
Industry illustrates such an anomaly . 
Table .2 
Year Coal Nominal Wages Year Coal Nominal Wages 
1900 163 1908 152 
1901 153 1909 145 
1902 142 1910 146 
1903 138 1911 144 
1904 134 1912 152 
1905 132 1913 163 
1906 136 1914 160 
1907 1.57 
SOURCE: Bowley, p. 8. 
The tragic story o£ the miners is eloquently told in these 
figures . It took £ourteen years £or wages to regain the level 
reached in 1900, and this was only accomplished by the Minimum 
Wage Act o£ 1912. A quick comparison with Table 1 will show 
the correlation between the £luctuations in the miner's wage 
and the aggregate wage. Appendix A provides the £igures o£ 
other industries. These numbers were remarkably stagnant 
throughout the period revealing how signi£icant the Coal In-
dustry's £igures were . It is critical to note that the most 
important catalysts in the growth of both union membership 
and the increase in trade disputes during the years 1910 to 
1914 were the miners, railwaymen, and unskilled workers (es-
pecially transport workers). The miners' plight has been 
documented. The railway and transport £igures ~ not included 
in the aggregate nominal wage table. Yet, it is £airly well 
known that in both ot these industries, wages and work condi -
tions were abominable. 21 
21See either Danger£ield or Askwith. 
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This section ' s purpose has been to establish that the 
period from 1900 to 1914 was at best, one of stagnation for 
the worker. 22 Nominai wages struggled throughout the entire 
period to regain the levels of 1900. Meanwhile, prices were 
consistently rising faster than wages. That these phenomena 
were felt by the worker is apparent from almost all of the 
literature of the period. 23 Consi'dered in the framework es-
tablished earlier of greater education, more leisure time, 
and innovations in technology, a causal relationship can be 
seen for the subsequent growth of trade unionism and the 
Labour Party. In particular, the plight of the worker in the 
three major industries involved in the unrest of 1910 to 1914 
was most severe. All of these men (miners, railwaymen, and 
transport workers) were part of industries that were integrally 
connected with the British economy. Their efforts to enhance 
their positions were directly felt by the entire country and 
even further added to the growing class consciousness of the 
period. 
How did all of these underlying trends become visible 
in the period under scrutiny? The rest of this chapter will 
attempt to answer this question. The peculiar growth of trade 
unionism will be traced. In particular, an emphasis will be 
placed on how unionism differed from the previous types of 
unionism, the nature of the disputes from 1910 to 1914, and 
22J . H. Clapham, An Economic History of Modern Britain, 3 
vols. (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1938), 3:474. 
23An examination of LRC and TUe Annual Reports is helpful 
in illustrating this perception. 
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the connection between trade unionism and politics. Thus , 
the groundwork has been laid £or an understanding o£ the re -
markable rise :to power o£ the worker. He was now un£ettered 
by the crippling disability o£ illiteracy. Technology had 
turned his world upside down. He worked hard and yet seemed 
to get little return £or his herculean e££orts. Yet, there 
was a "new spirit abroad o£ unrest". The only question that 
remained was how much longer the worker would remain quietly 
£rustrated. Undoubtedly he was not going to wait £orever . 
The timing and tactics used to accomplish his ends would rock 
the very £oundations o£ British li£e. 
Consolidation, Amalgamation, and Federation 
Be£ore 1889, the overriding characteristic o£ British 
trade unionism was sectionalism. The most common unit was 
the cra£t union. Communication with other cra£ts was rare 
and separatism was the watchword. Operatives who were not 
apprenticed, yet had acquired a skill in mills or the mine 
also £ormed separate unions early in the nineteenth century.24 
However, the unskilled labourer was still as yet unorganized. 
This entire situation changed with the year 1889. There 
seemed to be a new spirit in this year as men such as John 
Burns and Tom Mann led the way in the £ormation o£ unions in 
the transport industry, municipal employment, and other un-
skilled labour. All o£ these kinds o£ labour joined a new 
type o£ union. The General Union was £ounded which cut across 
24H.A. Clegg, Alan Fox, and A.F. Thompson, Hi:s.tory o£ 
British Trade Unionism Since 1882., 2 vols. (Ox£ord: Clarendon 
Press, 1964}, 1:12~. 
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occupational and industrial lines . This new type o£ union 
was motivated by a £eelingo:fjc"!tasssolidari ty. The spectacular 
strikes o£ 1889, best typi£ied by the London Dockers all pointed 
to the end o£ sectionalism and the beginning o£ a "New Unionism".25 
Yet, the 1890s saw a period o£ retrenchment by employers . 
The new unions o£ 1889, while still in existence, exerted 
little or no power and their imluence was £elt only through 
sporadic stoppages during the decade. Indeed, the 1890s were 
years o£ reaction and the Boer War helped make the "New Unionism " 
an umu£illed promise . The impetus £or another and more per-
manent growth in union membership came in 1901 £rom the courts 
in the £amous Ta££ Vale Judgement. The House o£ Lords ruled 
that trade unions could be held responsible £or monetary losses 
incurred during a strike. Ta££ Vale showed the necessity o£ 
a political struggle. Not only did this crippling decision 
reinvigorate trade unionism, but it also immeasurably aided 
the young and struggling Labour Representative Committee. 
ASter 1889, and especially a£ter Ta££ Vale, the most 
important development in industrial relations was the general 
consolidation o£ unionism. It is constructive to trace the 
most important types o£ centralization that occurred. 26 For 
25By 1900, cra£t, operative, and the "new" unions aecounted 
£or more than 75% o£ all union membership . The rural areas 
and smaller industries such as £ishing and £arming were as 
yet very unorganized and sectional. But £our-£i£ths o£ the 
population lived in urban areas. There£ore, this discussion 
is only pertinent to the urban worker who was by far the most 
preponderant. 
26This section is based on Sidney and Beatrice Webb ' s, 
History o£ British Trade Unionism (New York: Longmans, Greend 
and Co., 1920). 
there is no doubt that it was a direct product of a growing 
class consciousness. 
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The most powerful union of the nineteenth century was 
that of the Cotton Operatives. Despite this sfength, the 
union had been splintered into highly autonomous bodies of 
spinners , weavers, reelers, carders, blowers, etc. But by 
the turn of the century , these groups became united in first 
a federal body for each sector, and then a general body of 
the Textile Factory Worker's Association . 
The Building trades also saw a similar type of central-
ization grow after 1890 with such groups as the Amalgamated 
Society of Operative House and Ship Painters and Decorators 
forming. Tom Mann, John Burns, and George Barnes all came 
from the Amalgamated Society of Engineers. Other metal trades , 
and in particular the Boilermakers, and Shipwrights were 
undergoing constant consolidation absorbing local associa-
tions throughout this period. 
The most important development of 1889 was the formation 
of the General Workers Union. This union floundered in the 
'90s. But from 1910 to 1913 , it grew from 5000 to 91,000 
members. The most important development within the union 
was in the transport sector under the leadership of Mann. 
S eamen, ij ightermen, t{·ock and Wharf workers, coal porters , and 
carmen all joined together to form the National Transport 
Workers Federation in November of 1910. The NTWF was one of 
the major contributors to the unrest of 1911 to 1914. The 
importance of this group was se~n in its partial success in 
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engendering sympathetic strikes from other industries it was 
connected to . The NTWF almost succeeded in bringing commer-
cial life to a halt in the summer of 1911. 
The largest numerical force in trade unionism during 
this period was the mining industry. In 1888, the Miners 
Federation of Great Britain formed out of six smaller unions . 
Wi t h the addition of the Northumberland and Durham miners in 
1908 , the MFGB reached the figure of 600,000 in membership. 
The national strike of 1912 paralyzed England and forced 
through the Minimum Wage Act. By this .time, Robert Smillie 
of the ILP had become president of the MFGB. The affiliation 
of the MFGB to the Labour Party was a crucial step in the 
history of the workers ' movement as Lib-Labism in the coal -
fields began to wane. 
The last major area of consolidation was in the Railway 
industry. In the mid-1890s, railway unions were scattered. 
But with the reaction of the period against unionism, the 
"All Grades Movement" (cutting across all railway-type occu-
pations)'began and doubled union membership by 1897 . The 
Railway industry was perhaps the most economically depressed 
trade at the opening of the twentieth century. This led to 
a very serious strike in 1907 which was only settled by the 
Conciliation Board scheme proposed by Lloyd George. This 
proved unsatisfactory and in 1913, three of the five major 
unions (General Workers, Pointsmen, and Signalmen ) formed 
the National Union of Railwaymen . 
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Thus, by 1914, this process of consolidation had become 
the overwhelming trend in trade unionism. By 1914, five -
sixths of all trade union membership was contained in only 
100 unions. The Trades Union Congress which had been but a 
nominal organ for some thirty years after its founding in the 
mid-1860s, was now the major voice of the union world, pro -
viding both money and food for strikers and indispensable 
financial support for the Labour Party. The cUlmination of 
all of these trends came on April 23, 1914 when the NUR, MFGB, 
and NTWF formed the Triple Alliance. The Alliance was to be 
the mechanism by which each of these unions could come to 
each others aid while one of them was striking. The Triple 
Alliance was potentially the tool that could be used to achieve 
the revolutionary Syndicalist dream of the General Strike. 
Thus, the craft unionism that dominated England before 1889 
had been all but destroyed by the outbreak of World War I. 
The class consciousness which had been forged by a combina-
tion of frustration and aspiration began to exercise its new 
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In the introduction to BBn Tillett ' s History of the Trans -
~ort Worker's Strike of 1911, Harry Quelch tried to describe 
the difference between the Dockers strikes of 1889 and 1911 . 
.. . there seemed to be a greater spontaneity, a 
broader conception of the ultimate objectives of 
the working-class struggle . .. and a stronger feel-
ing of solidarity and of al l that solidarity im-
plies than ever before. 27 
Though Quea.~hM3 t:~ words are those of an intransigent Marxist , 
it is difficult not to be at least partially persuaded by 
his argument after examining the strike figures in table 6 . 
Trade union membership leaped by 1 .6 million in a mere four 
years. Those same four years saw more stoppages than at any 
time in Britishi industrial history. Anyone who sees the strike 
wave to be but a temporary phenomenoh subsiding by the War 
is belying the actual figures. 28 In fact, the number of dis-
27Benjamin Tillett, History of the London Transport 
Worker's Strike 1..211 (London: NTWF Pub . , 1911), p. iii. 
28A counter argument might be to note that the amount 
of days lost actually was lower in 19.13 and 1914 than either 
1909,1911, or 1912. The point I am making is that the number 
of strikes, and thus the willingness to strike was not dimi-
nishing. 1911 and 1912's figures are bloated due to the effec t 
of the Dockers' and Miners' strikes on all industries. In 
fact, it is interesting to note that the amount of days lost 
in 1914 was only a half year figure because of the war. If 
one doubled it , it would be the second highest of the period . 
putes in 1914 was the second highest ever recorded . Even 
more remarkable is that all of the strikes in 1914 occurred 
before the moratorium declared on disputes after the open-
ing of the First World War in August of 1914. The frustra-
tion of the twenty-five years before 1910 finally exploded 
J6 
in an incredible wave of strikes which stunned all of England 
in the years 1910 to 1914. In order to show how the growing 
consciousness of this period was translated into action, it 
is necessary to examine the nature of these strikes. 
It is not the purpose of this section to give a complete 
history of the strike wave of 1910 to 1914.29 A brief cata-
logue of the most important strikes of the period will give 
the reader a sense of the utter chaos that many viewed the 
period as representing. On September 1, 1910, the miners in 
the Rhondda Valley of S. Wales struck the Cambrian Combine 
demanding a minimum wage to circumvent the unfairness of 
piece-pay in abnormal places (bad seams). The miners became 
violent and were controlled only by Asquith sending General 
Macready and the police in to quiet the strikers. The miners 
were eventually starved into submission. 
August 8 , 1911 marked the beginning of the London Trans-
port Workers attempt to get a minimum wage from Lord Devonport 
of the Port of London Authority. This was settled by the 
arbitration mirac les of George Askwith and the threat of mili -
29Askwith's is excellent and Dangerfield provides a 
colorful if not always accurate account of the period . 
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tary intervention by Winston Chrchill. August 5 had seen the 
Liverpool Railwaymen strike only to be appeased by Lloyd 
George's plea f'or national unity during the Agadir Crisis . 
March 1, 1912 witnessed the most dangerous strike as the 
miners of the entire country went out demanding a minimum 
wage. This was eventually agreed to in principle (but not 
in the actual wage) by an Act of Parliament. The Dockers 
went out again in May of' 1912 . Five cabinet members tried 
to settle this strike and f'ailed miserably. The most notable 
strike of 1 913 was in Dublin led by the charismatic lunatic 
James Larkin. The Dublin Transport Workers struck demanding 
union recognition. The TUC sent funds , but the union was 
tragically starved into submission. 
The most typical explanation of these strikes is to 
put them under the general title of Syndicalism. Syndical-
ism30 refers to the writings of' P9Uoutier and Sorel. These 
Frenchmen preached a gospel advocating a violent succession 
of' continuous strikes, culminating in a "General Expropriatory 
Strike" in which the workers woill ld seize the means of produc-
tion and take control of industry. The producers were to 
control all industries and all services. Certainly many of' 
the younger leaders of' the "new unionism" (Mann, Gosling, Tillett) 
were influenced by Syndicalism. 31 There was some evidence 
30There are different shades of Syndicalism . . Sorel's 
brand was much more violent and revolutionary and was the 
most influential in England. There was also a more conserva-
tive shade which a Durkheim could approve · of'. This paper will 
only deal with Sorel's "revolutionary" Syndicalism . 
31Dangerfield, p. 232. 
) 
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o£ this in the rail and dock strikes which were the most spec-
tacular o£ the period. However, this argument is only partially 
true . The British worker was not generally supportive o£ 
such violence and class. control. Indeed, there was a good 
deal more spontaneity in the strikes o£ the period. Yet, 
the lack o£ success by people such as Larkin and Mann in getting 
substantial support £or sympathetic strikes reveals the limi -
ted in£luence o£ Syndicalism on the British worker. It is 
more correct to view revolutionary Syndicalism as one o£ the 
most notable £orces o£ the period which helped crystallize 
the worker's view o£ his position in society.32 
The great bulk o£ stoppages were caused by much more 
speci£ic grievances which had nothing to do with the violent 
overthrow o£ th i:n~~rtrur~8r:rf~ , The major cause was o£ course 
a demand £or a wage hike or even £or a Ih:ilimimumwwage. This 
desire £or a national minimum was symptomatic o£ a new Bri -
tish class consciousness. Another major demand was £or union 
recognition. Be£ore 1910, most employers would not even deal 
with unions. Despite what many have argued (Danger£ield in 
particular), the British worker was still interested in 
working through established institutions and processes (i.e. 
trade unionism and a Labour "Party"). The other major cause 
o£ many strikes was related to this union issue. There was 
a growing trend among unionists to re£use to work with un-
a£filiated men. The Docker strike o£ May, 1912 was fought 
32Danger£ield, pp. 231-232. 
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on this issue . Thus, the causes of the unrest of 1910 to 1914 
lie more in the fundamental changes that occurred in the late 
nineteenth century and the material conditions of the period 
than in a desire for revolution. 
It should be noted that in many cases, the actions of 
the government exacerbated the industrial situation of these 
years. In particular, the threat and use of force in settling 
s ome of these disputes helped unite the working class even 
more . The government appeared incompetent and unaware. 
So far as the Government was concerned, Ministers 
were immersed in constitutional struggles. They 
had little or no labour policy. The Members of 
the Government were strangely outside and ignorant 
of the labour movements in the country; or of any 
personal knowledge of the principal labour leaders . 33 
This statement came from a man within the government; the 
Board of Trade ' s own George Askwith. Yet, it must be said 
that the government was beleague~ed by i t s battle with the 
Lords , impending Irish Civil War, and the Suffragettes . These 
preoccupations confirmed a need for the working class to bind 
closer together to safeguard its interests. Many even felt 
that the government had little interest in them and that the 
social legislation of 1906 to 1914 was not very substantial . 
Askwith himself contended that: 
The Trade Disputes Act was carried on grounds of 
political expediency ... the ' Coal Mines Regulation 
of 1908 would never have got through if the Parlia-
mentary representatives of labour in the House of 
Commons had been a negligible quantity. The Old 
Age Pensions Act and the Children's Act were long 
overdue. The National Health Insurance Act of 191 1 
33Askwith, p . 352 . 
was almost entirely due to the work of Sir Hubert 
Llewellyn Smith.34 
40 
If someone within the government could feel this way about 
the Liberals, there is little doubt that others felt the same. 
The nature of the strikes of the period was such that 
the entire working class was profoundly influenced by the 
disputes. The stoppages of the NTWF, NUR, and the MFGB were 
felt by everyone. Thus, by 1914 the worker had become acutely 
sensitive to his distinctive position in society. The growth 
of education, the reduction in the work week, and the advances 
in technology coupled with the events of 1910 to 1914 all 
pointed to this fact. The growth in trade union membership 
and the centralization of the union world as a whole showed 
that the worker did indeed feel a need to unite with his fellow 
wage-earner. Revolutionary Syndicalism and the actions of 
the government all helped crystallize this new consciousness. 
Thus, the years 1910 to 1914 saw the greatest potential for 
change that the political system of England had had to face 
in hundreds of years. The worker would no doubt attempt to 
achieve his aspirations through the political system. But 
this would now occur on his own terms and through his own 
channels (trade Unionism). 
"Political Unionism" 
Attempting to link trade unionism to political action 
is a difficult task. One cannot hope to establish that a 
34Askwith, p. 353. 
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large growth in unionism was directly translated into an equal 
growth in the political Labour movement . Strong family tradi -
tions of voting Conservative or Liberal would not be abrogated 
in a short space of time. A large political Labour movement 
was a new phenomenon and there was more of. a probability that 
a Labour~Liberal coalition would form (as witnessed by the 
Lib-Lab tradition in the coal-fields) than a strong indepen-
dent political party . Yet, because of a string of external 
events which tended to conspire against Labour, the new con-
sciousness of the worker was almost forced to take refuge in 
an independent Labour movement. While tracing these events, 
it is productive to examine the transformation of class con-
sciousness into political consciousness. A brief study of 
TUC conferences from the early 1890s through 1914 in conjunc-
tion with an examination of the external pressures of the 
period will actually show the evolution of this "political" 
unionism. 
In 1892, the TUC passed a resolution supporting the es -
tablishment of the Independent Labour Party (ILP).35 There 
had been earlier attempts at building a "Labour" party uniting 
all wings of the British left. The decisive factor was the 
disillusionment that had set in after the failure of the "new 
unionism" to expand after 1889. By 1893, the TUC alone ( t here 
were many unions not yet in the TUC) could boast a membership 
of 900,000.36 Another major external development which spurred 
35TUC Annual Conference Report (1 89~ ). 
36Ibid ", (1 893 )· 
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the trade union movement on to more active and autonomous 
political action was disappointment with the Liberal Govern-
ment under Rosebery.37 The Liberal Party had been fairly 
oblivious to the plight of the workingman tHi!U90CLtt'S "!)6U'4;b 
Datles" ~ejMg an enca,.i;c). One of the results of this Li-
beral apathy can be seen in the increasingly "socialistic" 
resolutions of the TUC. Perhaps the most remarkable example 
of this tendency was the passage of Keir Hardie ' s sweeping 
resolution strongly stating: 
That in the opinion of this Congress it is essential 
to the maintenance of British industries to na t i:o,n-
a lise the land and the whole means of production, 
distribution, and exchange.38 
This resolution won an impressive 219-61 vote of approval . 
The spirit of this proclamation reflected a new political 
consciousness on the part of trade unionism and at the same 
time was a product of disenchantment. Many more radical TUC 
motions, though less sweeping in scope , were continually passed 
throughout the decade. 
The Taff Vale Judgement of 1901 did more to wed trade 
unionism to politics than any other single force of the pre-
war period. The unions were forced to support an independent 
labour movement more strongly than ever before . The establish-
ment of the Labour Representative Committee in 1900 was not 
universally acclaimed in the Labour world. But after Taff 
Vale, this situation dramatically changed as the first truly 
37 Clarke, Lancashire ami tthe New !liberalism ( Cambridge : 
University Press, 1971), p~ 
effective parliamentary fund was set up in 1902. By 1904, 
the TUC's membership had reached 1.5 million. That same year , 
the TUC passed a resolution in ~avor o~ Old Age Pensions.J9 
The e~~ect o~ political unionism was power~ully ~elt in the 
election o~ 1906. With the increasing strength o~ the LRC, 
the Liberal Party had acquiesced (~or its own bene~it as well 
as the LRC's) in the entry o~ twenty-nine Labour M.P.s to 
parliament. The importance o~ political unionism was then 
seen in practical terms through the passage o~ the Trade Dis-
putes Act o~ 1909 overturning Taf~ Vale. 
Though the trade union movement was the major vehicle 
~or working class consciousness of the period, it was by no 
means the only one. Although they were the base o~ the Labour 
Party, the unions were not able to wrest control o~ the LRC 
~rom Ramsay MacDonald and Keir Hardie. A~ter these early 
attempts at control, the union movement began to work with 
the LRC as a separate yet fraternal body. The history o~ 
political unionism ~rom 1906 to 1914 is largely the story of 
a growing cooperation between two distinct groups ~or common 
ends. One group was industrial and one group was political . 
There of course was not complete harmony.40 But the term 
political unionism begins to take on a different meaning as 
we reach the War. For as the Labour Party became politically 
stronger, it was able to e~~ectively assert its operational 
J9TUC Report (1902 ). 
40See Tillett ' s I s the Parliamentary Labour Party a Failure? 
) 
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independence £rom the trade union movement .41 
In 1909, the TUC had grown to 1. 7 million members . That 
same year , it passed the £ollowing amendment: 
This Congress is o£ the opinion that the establish-
ment o£ a recognised minimum wage in all industries 
is essential to the wel£are o£ the nation, and urges 
the Labour
4
Party in Parliament to introduce (such) 
a measure. 2 
This declaration shows a speci£ic interest in crossing trade 
lines to aid the labour movement as a whole . The trade union 
movement had certainly come a long way £rom the separatism 
which had marked the cra£t unions o£ the nineteenth century . 
In 1910, there was yet another blow to political unionism 
with the Osborne Judgement making it illegal to use union 
£unds to support political activities . This judgement would 
be the true test o£ whether or not the TUC was committed to 
an independent political Labour movement. The TUC rose to 
the occasion by strongly denouncing the Osborne Judgement in 
1910,1911, and 1912. In 1911, the TUC went on to unanimously 
pass resolutionscalling £or the nationalization .'Ocf' the railways . 
It also passed a resolution congratulating the strikers o£ 
that year.43 
In 1913, the last year be£ore the Great War, political 
41 The major proo£ £or this was the change in status o£ 
the trade councils a£ter 1910. These industrial groups had 
£ormerly been the points o£ local contact £or the LRC. But 
a£ter 1910, the trend had been towards these groups giving up 
theirt a:.§filia ti(b,na t :fu. -£aYor:fe£c.sol:eIYl"pol:±t~caitboElies:;- ' ~ 5'_ehapter 
2 provides more detail on this development . 




unionism reached its zenith.44 The executive of the TUC tri -
umphantly announced that there were now 2,232 million members. 
The second major accomplishment of the conference was the 
successful fusion of the TUe, Labour Party, and General Feder-
ation of Trade Unions which had first been discussed in 1911. 
This meant that these three bodies would house their offices 
in the same building. A Joint Board would be set up to es-
tablish political rules for trade unions to insure closer 
cooperation and at the same time maintain the separation 
between the industrial and political wings of the movement. 
But by far the most important development was the TUC's reac -
tion to the Trade Unions Act of 1913. After four years of 
constant pressure, the Liberal Government had finally over-
turned the Osborne Judgement, but with one condition. Each 
union would have to hold a vote to determine whether or not 
it would set up a parliamentary fund. Those individuals who 
voted no could in effect "contract out" of paying a levy 
supporting the Labour Party. The challenge had been made 
and the future of the Labour Party now hung in the balance. 
The TUC laid to rest any question of where it stood. In an 
overwhelming vote of confidence, the Congress passed a reso -
lution strongly insisting on the establishment of a parlia-
mentary fund. 45 Later that year, most unions voted to set 
up the individual funds. 46 
44By 1913, the influence of revolutionary Syndicalism 
was diminishing. See Dangerfield, pp. 314-330. 
45TUC Report (1913). 
46Ross McKibbin, The Evolution of the Labour Party (London: 
Oxford Press, 1974), p~l. 
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Between 1886 and 1914 , the working ct:Utas movement in Great 
Britain had indeed come a long way. Created by a variety of 
revolutionary changes during the 1870s and '80s , the Labour 
movement was transformed from a nebulous new spirit to a very 
tangible and distinctly British political consciousness by 
1914. Certain external events served as catalysts in causing 
the political unionism of the early 1900s. This consciousness 
then crystallized in the form of trade unionism and a separate 
and independent political movement. It is now natu~al to 
turn to the Labour Party . For its history is the history of 
that very peculiar British working class consciausness which 
took shape in these years. The Labour Party's story was 
filled with the same types of contradictions, constraints , 
and excitement that were the essence of the new working class . 
CHAPTER II 
ASQUITH'S FLUNKEYS 
Suddenly politicians of all parties realise that a 
new factor in politics has appeared; that organised 
labour as a political force is already a menace to 
the easygoing gentlemen of the old school. 
(LRC Annual Conference-1906) 
The General Election of 1906 proved to be the greatest 
landslide in the history of British politics. The Liberal 
Party sent no less than 400 M.P.s to parliament and could 
count on the support of an additional 113 M.P. s .1 Perhaps 
the most startling result of the election was the appearance 
of twenty-nine M. P . s from the young Labour Party. In six 
short years, the Labour Representative Committee had become 
a force to be reckoned with. Thus, a major question which 
arose after 1906 was whether or not this Labour Party would 
continue its march flarward and become the successor to the 
Liberal Party? The purpose of this chapter is to answer this 
tantalizing question. Did the Labour Party after 1906 pose 
a real threat to Campbell-Bannerman's party? 




On February 27, 1900, 129 men crowded into Memorial Hall 
in London and passed the £ollowing resolution: 
A Resolution in £avor o£ establishing a distinct 
Labour Group in Parliament, who should have their 
own Whips and agree upon their policy which must 
embrace a readiness to co-operate with any party, 
which £or the time being may be engaged in promo-
ting legislation in the direct interest o£ Labour, 
and be equally ready to associate themselves with 
any party in opposing measures having an opposite 
tendency.2 
The L.R.C. had been born. Yet, £rom its inception, the party ' s 
£ortunes were £raught with di££iculty. For liThe Labour Party 
(was) a Federation consisting o£ Trade Unions, Trade Councils, 
Socialist Societies, and Local Labour Parties." 3 Included 
in this £ederation were the Social Democratic Federation, 
the Fabian Society, and the Independent Labour Party. These 
groups spanned the entire spectrum o£ British working class 
ideology. 
Siilnce the early 1880s, the le£t in England had been badly 
splintered over how the working class ' s interests could best 
be served. The S.D.F. o£ Hyndman and Quelch was a strong 
group o£ intransigent Marxists who openly preached class war-
£are. Shaw, Pease, and the Webbs 6£ the Fabian society were 
middle class intellectuals who£avored social re£orm within 
the constraints o£ the parliamentary system. Keir Hardie's 
I.L.P. was £ounded in 1893 as a result o£ the disillusionment 
2Philip P. Poirier, The Advent o£ the Labour Party (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., .1958), p. 84 . 
3LRC Annual. Comerence Report (1910), p. 112. 
) 
that accompanied the limited success of the "new Unionism" 
of 1889. The I . L.P. was primarily a socialist and working 
class party but possessed neither the intransigence of the 
S.D.F. nor the intellectual snobbery of the Fabians. Hardie 
and Ramsay MacDonald were pragmatists who throughout the 1890s 
searched for practical solutions to working class problems. 
It was the I . L.P. which was able to join these other groups 
together. With the blessing of the Trades Union Congress, 
Hardie was finally able to fuse working class interests into 
a united political movement. It is important to realize that 
most trade unions were traditionally Liberal. - It was only 
after the disappointment of Rosebery ' s government that serious 
thought was given to distinct Labour representation. Thus , 
the uneasy alliance which had been forged in Memorial Hall 
was more a product of disenchantment than a result of a 
common political consciousness. 
As a result of the disparate nature of the L.R.C., two 
major problems presented themselves immediately to the National 
Executive Committee. R.T. McKenzie has defined these diffi-
culties as "problems of coherence and control".4 Naturally, 
it was expected that a "Labour Party" would put forth a spe-
cific programme of action. Yet , because of the vast ideolo-
gical differences between the S.D.F., the Fabians, the Unions , 
and the I.L . P., it was _ impossible to take any strong line of 
action. It is true that most members of the L.R . C. were 
4R. T. McKenzie, British Political Parties (London: 
William Hetnemann Ltd., 1955), p. 385. 
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socialists, but of different degrees and types. Thus, in 
order to maintain their fragile alliance , Hardie and the I.L.P . 
took it upon themselves to steer a delicate course between 
the more extreme S.D.F . and the more conservative tradeUcrUon-
ists. The S.D.F . attempted to turn the L.R.C. into an avowedly 
Marxist organization. In a resolutioh, they felt that the 
new party should be: 
... based upon the recognition of the class war, 
and having for its ultimate object the socializa-
tion of the means of production, distribution, and 
exchange.5 
This proposal was soundly defeated. Hardie maintained that 
"the propaganda of the class hatred is not one which can ever 
take root in this country ... Mankind in the mass is not moved 
by hatred but by h rve of what is right. If we could have 
socialism on the S.D.F . lines nothing would be changed-save 
for the worse.,,6 Hardie and MacDonald had to be very careful 
not to alienate the trade unionists who made up two-thirds of 
the L . R.C. Thus MacDonald would insists that "Socialism has 
to be adapted to the organisation of the state."? The pre-
carious balance of the L.R.C was maintained only by deliberately 
keeping the programme ideologically ambiguous. Therefore, 
the L.R.C. was at first. little more than an interest group 
whc$4. aim was to alleviate certain specific legal and social 
disabilities of the working class. 
5G ... D.H. Cole, Britishi Working Class Politics: 1832-"t914 
(London: George Rout l edge & Sons, Ltd., 1944), p. 15? 
6Poirier, p. 14J. 
?Ibid., p . 92 . 
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A more serious difficulty which was to plague the Labour 
Partythroughout its first eighteen years was the problem of 
control. The L.R.C . was more or less "thrust" upon the po -
litical scene by a variety of groups. The question of who 
would exert control over the party was fundamental for the 
firs t five years. The S.D.F. attempted to impose a socialist 
test on all L.R.C . candidates . But a party made up primarily 
of trade unionists was not ready to accept such control from 
as small a group as Hyndman's. The S.D.F. subsequently left 
the L.R.C. in August of 1901. Despite their small numbers, 
the socialists did supply much of the inspiration for the 
party. A much more serious threat to the N.E.C. came from 
the unionists. This challenge was embodied in Ben Tillett ' s 
1905 resolution insisting: 
That it be an instruction to the Executive of the 
L.R.C. to enforce the hearty adoption by L . R.C. 
candidates of all legislative proposals emanating 
from the Trades Union Congress. In view of the 
refusal of candidates, that it be the pre-emptory 
duty of the Executive to refuse or discontinue 
support financially and morally to said candidate 
or candidates.~ 
This resolution was resoundingly defeated 537 to 245. 9 Yet , 
it raised in its clearest form the problem of an independent 
party. It is essential to understand that more than anything 
else, independence, both from within and without of the party, 
was the most important goal of the leaders of the L. R.C. The 
founding resolution in Memorial Hall was the essence of this 
8Mckenzie, p. 389 . 
9Ibid., p. 390. 
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resolve . 
How was it possible for a party such as the L.R.C. to be 
truly independent? This dilemma came to the forefront at 
the 1903 conference in Newcastle. The chairman of the L.R.C. 
at this time was one Richard Bell. The president of the Amal -
gamated Railway Servants Union, Bell had always been a strong 
Lib-Lab advocate. The problem was that Bell ascha;irman had 
constantly compromised the position of the LRC by appearing 
on Liberal platforms and supporting Liberal candidates against 
L.R.C . men. In reaction to Bell and the general tendency to 
stray from the Labour fold, the so-called "Newcastle Resolution" 
was adopted which fundamentally revised the object of the LRC. 
To secure, by united action, the election to Parlia-
ment of candidates promoted, in the first instance, 
by an Affiliated Society or Societies in the constit-
uency, who undertake to form or join a distinct group 
in Parliament, with its own whips and its own policy 
on Labour questions, to abstain strictly from identi -
fying themselves with or promoting the interests of 
any section of the Liberal or Conservative Parties, 
and not to oppose any other candidate recognized by 
this committee. All such candidates shall pledge 
themselves to accept this constitution, to abide by 
the decisions of the Group in carrying out the aims 
of this constitution or resign, and to appear before 
their constituencies under the title Labour candi-
dates only:.10 
This amendment reveals both the weaknesses and tenacity of 
the young L.R.C. The party was forced to reaffirm its original 
position and to spell out in black and white a policy which 
would not have been necessary in a stronger party. Though 
the resignation clause was removed in 1904, the "Newcastle 
Resolution" became the cornerstone of the I.L.P .' s efforts 
10Mckenzie, p. 387. 
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to keep the L . R.C . on an independent course . 
The founding of the L.R.C. was a triumph for Hardie and 
MacDonald. Though there were serious difficulties in the 
nature of the Labour Alliance, the combination which the I . L . P . 
had striven for throughout the 1890s was finally a reality . 
Early Organization 
Ramsay MacDonald wrote in later years that "For six years 
the party was allowed to grow in obscurity . II11 Though this 
observation was a bit romantic, it does convey the re~ative 
serenity of the early years. The L.R.C. slowly evolved an 
organization which was able to make modest in-roads on the 
Liberal Party until 1906. From one perspective, this organi -
zation proved stifling and created much internal strife. Yet, 
on the whole, a fairly effective machine was assembled. 
The L.R.C. of 1900 had a membership of 353,070. Many 
unions (most conspicuously the miners) were as yet not affili -
ated. The major impetus for membership came from the courts 
in 1901 with the Taff Vale decision making unions liable for 
monetary losses incurred from strikes. The unions were forced 
to support political action in order to have this crippling 
decision repealed. By 1902, the number of affiliated unions 
had risen from forty-one to sixty-five and the membership was 
up to 455,450. In 1903, there were 127 unions with 847,315 
members. 12 Two of the largest unions, the engineers and the 
11Cole, p. 165. 
12Poirier, p. 141. 
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cotton~spinners had finally joined the L. R.C . in 1903. By 
July 1902, a Parliamentary fund had been set up and was in 
full operation to pay M.P.s. Along with this numerical growth 
were several stunning political successes. In 1901 no M.P.s 
other than Hardie and Bell represented the L.R.C. But in 
late 1902, David Shackleton won an important by-election in 
Clitheroe. An even more astounding victory was Will Crook's 
win at Woolwich in early 1903. The addition of Arthur Henderson 
at Barnard Castle in 1903 gave the L.R.C. a new-found respect 
and made the party a force that had to be taken into account. 
The organizations that ran the campaigns for Shackleton , 
Crooks, and Henderson were a motley collection of local I.L.P. 
branches, Trade Councils, and local L.R.C.s. Because the 
L.R.C. was origInally founded as a working class federation, 
candidatures were left up to affiliated groups who would make 
nominations and pay for election expenses. Most trade unions 
collected a levy of one pence a year from each member for 
the purpose of politics. Yet, there was not lias yet any uni-
form system or organization for the whole of the country." 13 
Approved societies would simply send in nominations to the 
N.E.C. and most of these were then approved. By 1906, approx-
itnately~1 one hundred local L.R.C. s were in existence. Yet, 
the problem of local jealousies haunted these groups. Several 
attempts were made to allow local L.R.C.s to directly affiliate 
with the national party . But the trade councils, those in-
13Mckenzie, p. 467. 
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congruous industrial bodies which represented all trades of 
an area, refused to give up their political power though they 
were primarily industrial groups. Those local L.R.C.s which 
grew in areas not covered by the trade councils were allowed 
to affiliate . Even at the local level, the delicate alliance 
of socialists and unionists had to be treated with the utmost 
caution. 
An even more unusual problem was that only exceptionally , 
as at Woolwich, Poplar, and Barnard Castle, were individuals 
allowed to join the L.R.C. directly. Otherwise, one could 
become a member only by joining an affiliated body. It was 
difficult to call the L .R.C. a party by 1906. MacDonald 
admitted that the L.R.C. still had " the limited mind of a 
Committee".14 Yet a parliamentary party had been called into 
being. It was a heterogeneous organization which revealed 
the tensions and ambiguities of the Memorial Hall Conference . 
It was at this stage that the political genius of Ramsay Mac-
Donald propelled the L.R.C. out of its "obscurity" and into 
the national limelight. 
The hallmark of the Labour Party ' s early successes was 
pragmatism. The I.L. P. had been able to found the L.R.C. 
only because it was aware of the realities of such an alliance . 
The Labour Party won twenty-nine seats in 1906 only because 
MacDonald realized the necessity of making a deal with the 
Liberals. In a series of secret meetings throughout 1903 
between MacDonald, Herbert Gladstone, the Liberal Chief Whip , 
14Mckenzie, p . 469. 
and his assistant, Jesse Herbert, the L.R.C. was given a free 
run in thirty seats. Hardie knew of these meetings and approved 
of the compact as a political necessity . The result was 
astounding) giving the L.R.C. 37% of the vote in the fifty 
seats they contested in 1906. However, this electoral bonanza 
concealed a much more fundmental result of the 1906 election 
for both the Liberal and what was now the Labour Party . 
"Lib-Labism" 
The Labour Party ' s relationship with the Liberal Party 
before 1914 is one of the most important factors that must 
be taken into consideration when assessing the political si -
tuation of this period. In attempting to ascertain whether 
or not the pre-war Labour Party was already a challenge to 
the Liberals, it becomes essential to distingiish the two 
groups. from each other . There are three 8JL>SaS in particular 
which are useful in putting Lib-Labism into perspective: 
ideological comparisions, political relationships, and rank 
and file comparisiDns::;i . 
Since the second half of the nineteenth century , the 
Liberal Party had come to support and become identified wi th 
religious Nonconformity, Irish Home Rule, and Free Trade. 
The ministries of Gladstone had thrived on these issues through-
out the period. However, towards the end of the century, a 
subtle shift began within the Liberal Party to meet the growing 
demand for solutions to unemployment, sickness , and economic 
inequality. Hw:::.evtlI"h'S- "Death Duties" THQPO 2Il_JiiHiFly Qxamp~ 
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0,£ this "Nev~ Liberalism". The major ideological revolution 
occurred at the turn o£ the century with the works o£ Hobson 
and Hobhouse in particular. A comprehensive view was put 
£orth~;:m.itlesizing the older Liberal ideals and the new theories 
o£ Socialism, Idealism, and Darwinism. Society was to take 
responsibility £or the individual. . The reasons £or this 
were varied.· The collectivists (e.g. T.H. Green) held a view 
o£ society which stressed the moral necessity o£ helping the 
individual and the empirical reality o£ man as a social crea-
ture. The "Millian" notion developed by Hobson and emphasi-
zing the economic bene£its that would accrue to the society 
as a whole by keeping the worker employed, imormed this "New 
Liberalism" with a more traditional individualistic £lavor 
that had been connected with the older in£luences on Liberal-
ism (e.g. Christian Socialism and Noncon£ormity). The £inal 
impetus to this new ideology was derived £rom the evolutionary 
theories o£ Darwin and Spencer which argued that society had 
developed as an organic whole. Thus the new Liberals could 
argue that helping an individual (or a part o£ the total 
society) was in essence only helping society as a whole. 15 
Sir William Harcourt was quite right when he said as early 
as the late 1880s that "We are all socialists now".16 
A£ter 1906, the radicals o£ the Liberal Party openly 
espoused this new ideology and attempted to put it into prac-
15Freeden gives an excellent account o£ this entire 
phenomenon in The New Liberalism. 
16Freeden, p . 25 . 
) 
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tice. The budget of 1909, the National Health Insurance Act, 
and all of the other landmark measures of social reform enacted 
by the Liberals from 1906 to 1914 should be seen within the 
framework of this new political theory . The entire Liberal 
Party did not of course openly embrace this "New Liberalism". 
Many have argued that these policies alienated large segments 
of the Liberal Party. In particular , the wealthier free -
traders who held the purse-strings were not enamored of Lloyd 
George and his radical cronies. Some historians have gone so 
far as to argue that with the decline of Nonconformity in 
England, the Liberal Party had lost the catalyst which had 
sustained it as a viable party.17 
The Labour Party of 1906 was still a group without a 
programme. Their major goal was the repeal of Taff Vale which 
was accomplished that very year in the Trades Disputes Act. 
The other major policies pursued were the Right to Work Bill 
and Old Age Pensions. Io.Qologically, the MacDonald wing of 
the party was congruous to the political thought of the "New 
Liberals" . The Labour Party heartily supported Lloyd George's 
budget and most of the Liberal legislation. Thus, it is very 
difficul t to distinguish the id,eological thrust of the bulk 
of the Labour Party from the increasingly influential radical 
wing of the Liberal Party. 
At the political level, Lib-Labism is a less tidy matter 
to deal with. The Gladstone-MacDonald entente held great 
17 John-E. Glaser, "English Nonconformity and the Decline 
of Liberalism", American Historical Review 63 (January, 1958 ). 
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potential for both parties . From the perspective of 190) , the 
pact seemed attractive to both sides. For the Liberals : "The 
gain to the party through a working agreement would be great , 
and can be measured best by a comparison of ' no arrangement ' 
with those (results) of ' an arrangement ,,! ;8 Indeed Labour 
had begun to lay important foundations for electoral support 
in the North. Much of the working class in Lancashire and 
Yorkshire was traditionally Tory. With men such as 'Shackle -
ton drawing Conservative support to the Labour Party in Cli -
theroe, an electoral deal was certainly beneficial to the 
Liberals. But if the Liberals made no pact, Jesse Herbert 
pointed out that "the Liberal Party would suffer defeat not 
only in those constituencies where L.R.C. candidates fought , 
but also in almost every borough, and in many divisions , of 
Lancashire and Yorkshire. This would be the inevitable result 
of unfriendly action towards the L.R.C .... (The L.R.C.) They 
would be defeated, but so also would (the Liberals) be de-
feated .,,1 9 The benefits of such an agreement to the Labour 
Party were even greater. With a still primitive organization , 
Labour could not hope to compete equally with the vast re-
sources of the established Liberal Party . Free runs in agreed 
locales would save much money for both parties. More impor-
tantly, the pact would provide Labour with a bridgehead to 
enter the political arena on a large scale for the first time . 
18Poirier , p . 189 . 
19Ibid. 
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The immediate advantages of the pact to the Liberal Party 
tendeds to obscure the long-range effect of such an agreement. 
The most obvious result was to allow Labour an independent 
political existence. Many Liberals felt that allowing Labour 
a free run in Tory areas was compromising the party's posi -
tion. Philip Stanhope, Shackleton's opponent at Clitheroe 
worried about the effects of accom~dation and claimed that 
"If the Liberal Party can only be made strong by giving away 
its strongest positions, all I can say is that its day of 
usefulness is gone. ,,20 The traditional Liberals (middle-class 
free traders) best typified by Alfred Illingworth of Bradford 
actually left the party over this policy. By allowing Labour 
free runs, the momentum that had been begun by Taff Vale and 
fueled by the by-election victories at Clitheroe, Woolwich, 
and Barnard Castle was translated practically to the organ-
izational level. The surprising nature of these early vic-
tories was now structuralized and was given a realistic chance 
of enduring. Thus, a Labour Party had now been institution-
alized by the Gladstone-MacDonald parley. 
Yet, the underlying contradictions posed by Lib-Labism 
for the Labour Party were great. The "Newcastle Resolution" 
was a real stumbling block for MacDonald. Independence had 
been crucial to the perpetuation of the party and this seemed 
to be deflated by the accord with the Liberals. This was a 
major reason why the Gladstone negotiations were held in 
20Poirier, p . 202 . 
) 
utmost secrecy. Though at a practical level , the pact pro -
vided and sustained independence, from a more fundamental 
vantage point the entente tended to water-down the working 
class nature of the Labour Alliance. Would Lib-Labism be 
the force that would eventually absorb the Labour Party into 
the Liberal Party? It was only through MacDonald ' s firm insis -
tance on the specific agreements with the Liberals that pre-
vented the party from losing its existence. In fact, we 
shall see that after 1910, the Liberal Party did break some 
of the agreements in several constituencies which served to 
help unify the Labour Party before 1914. The most important 
problem caused by Lib-Labism for the Labour Party was its 
effect on the rank and file. 
One of the majoD reasons that the I. L. P. had been formed 
in the 1890s was the general lack of working class candidates 
in either major party. There had been a growing antipathy 
towards the Liberal Party as it had continually rejected 
working class candidates and had the annoying habit of intro -
ducing its own men where L.R . C. men were already standing. 
The most blatant examples of this were in 1903 when Liberals 
were selected at Stockton-on-Tees, Sunderland, and most notably 
Barnard Castle against Henderson. With the Gladstone-MacDonald 
pact and the subsequent deals for 1906, disillusionment with 
the parliamentary party began to grow. This was exacerbated 
by the seemingly moderate stances 'of the party in the Commons . 
A militant socialist movement began to grow at this time and 
the entire issue came to a head in 1907 at the by-election 
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for Colne Valley . 
Victor Grayson , a young socialist was selected as the 
candidate for Colne Valley by the local I.L.P. The N.E.C. 
turned down his nomination because the local branches that 
nominated him were not affiliated with the national party. 
In a "passionate and tumultuous" campaign, Grayson won without 
official Labour support. His victory became symbolic of the 
growing discord within the party. At the I.L . P. conference 
in 1908 , these tensions came out in the open. Jim Larkin of 
Ireland said he "would not sink his socialism in the Labour 
Party" and exclaimed "socialists for Grayson, the remainder 
for yo.ursel ves . ,,21This t iYipe of sentiment became characteristic 
of the Labour Party after this period. The National Executive 
was constantly and effectively being attacked by the militant 
wing of the party. The most eloquent critic was of course 
the omnipresent wizard of the NFTW Ben Tillett, who described 
the N.E.C. as "Press flunkeys to Asquith" and as "sheer hypo-
crites " . Tillett went on to claim that MacDonald and Henderson 
would "for ten and five guineas a time ... lie with the best" . 
The N.E.C. was "softly feline in their purring to Ministers 
and their patronage . .. repaying with gross betrayal the class 
that willingly supports them . ,,22 
The cUlmination of this attitude came in the September, 
1908 by-election at Newcastle. Newcastle was one of the 
21David Marquand, Ramsa~ M?cDonald (London : Jonathan 
Cape , 1977), p. 107. .. 
22Mckenzie, p . 395. 
) 
constituencies covered by MacDonald ' s entente with Gladstone . 
When the Liberal seat fell vacant and a Labour man was nomi-
nated, MacDonald was quick to force his withdrawal. When 
this occurred, the Social Democratic Party put up a candidate 
and the Newcastle I.L.P . supported him. The S.D.P. candi-
date was badly defeated . Yet , this rebellion began a trend 
which MacDonald and Henderson had to constantly try to check 
after 1908. 
The Executive was in most cases able to assert its author-
ity effectively and maintain cordial relations with the Libe~al 
Party. There was real rank and file dissatisfaction. Yet , 
it must be remembered that the Labour Party was overwhelmingly 
dominated by trade unionists, both in numbers and funds. The 
socialists were occasionally pacified by the acceptance of 
more leftist resolutions at national conferences. However , 
the N.E.C. was growing stronger every year. The contro l 
problem that plagued the party in its early years was no longer 
as severe as it once was . The salient feature of the first 
ten years of the Labour Party was its opportunism and its 
ability to consolidate each gain. 
Though called into exis tence by external socia-economic 
forces and the dissatisfaction of the time, the Labour Party 
was an institution very much shaped and defined by the tra-
ditions and constraints of the British electoral system. The 
first major impetus for the party's growth came from the 
system,~ inirt.ne form of the Taff Vale Judgement. The diff icul-
ties posed by a political system that was not favorable towards 
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third parties was somewhat avoided by the Gladstone-MacDonald 
pact. Yet, perhaps even more important to the early years 
of Labour's existence was the pragmatism and political acumen 
of its leaders. The contradictions inherently part of the 
Memorial Hall Conference were glossed over in such a way as 
to actually benefit the party. Yet, the Grayson revolt was 
the first sign of trouble brewing in the rank and file. This 
*1-
challenge along with the tumult of years 1910 to 1914 presented 
the party with an entirely new set of problems. Thus, the 
last four years before the war were critical for the survival 
of Labour. The ways in which these problems and challenges 
• were met and solved la;1 d the foundation for the future of a 
Labour Party that would survive the Liberal Party and the 
upheavals of the greater portion of the twentieth century. 
The Evolution of the Labour Party : 191 0-14 
(a)-Constraints 
"The year upon which we have just entered is likely to 
be a momentous one for Labour ... Labour has become aggressive , 
and is not merely opposing attack, but is determined upon 
advances . ,,23 And so Philip Snowden greeted the year 1910. 
1910 was indeed to be an important year; not just for the 
Labour Party but for the country as well. 1910 was to open 
a new chapter in British history. The next four years were 
to be tumultuous and full of uncertainty. For the Labour 
Party , those four years were to present the N.E.C. with an 
23Askwith, p. 175 . 
) 
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entirely new set of challenges . Yet some of the old Ubiqui -
tous problems of the party were still imluential in these 
years. It is therefore important to first examine some of 
the traditional constraints of the British political system 
a;~how they affected the fortunes of the Labour Party. These 
constraints were products of both the external political si-
tuation of the period and the internal obstacles engendered 
by the nature of the party machine and the political system . 
The second half of this section will trace the variety of 
new stimuli 'Nhich began to mold Labour into a party after 
1910. By the time World War I broke out, the Labour Party 
had reached a critical juncture in its development. The 
purpose of this section is to understand what that juncture was . 
The year 1910 marked the beginning of the constitutional 
struggle over the House of Lords. The fight over the Parlia-
ment Act led to the reopening of the question of Irish Home 
Rule and the possibility of impending civil war. These crises 
were the most time-consuming and important matters of the 
day. Their effect on the Labour Party was direct and crippling . 
At the party comerence at Newport in 1910, it was strongly 
stated that: 
The grave constitutional issues which are at stake 
will now have to be fought to a finish. The Liberal 
Party will hardly be able to draw back, and the House 
of Lords will have to be dealt with before any Pa2~y 
can make substantial progress with social reform. 
This remark illustrates the difficulty the party found itself 
24Labour Party Comerence Report (1910), p.2 . 
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in. Certainly Labour did support the Liberals in their efforts 
to reform the House of Lords and pass Lloyd George's budget. 
But to relegate "Labour" issues to a secondary position seemed 
to compromise the purpose of the party. With the probability 
of one or more General Elections on the horizon, Labour was 
caught in a bind. Philip Snowden years later would admit 
that : 
It must be said in justice that the position of 
the Labour Party in that Parliament (1909-10) was 
very difficult. They had really to choose between 
a Liberal and a Tory Government. There was nothing 
to be hoped for from a Tory Government but reaction. 
The Liberal Government in the main was going slowly 
in our way.25 
COUld the Labour Party take the responsibility for bringing 
the Liberals down? There was no doubt that such a strategy 
would do immeasurable harm to the future of the party. The 
Labour Party held most of its seats by the grace of the Liberal 
Party . The Liberal chief whip, J.A. Pease warned the Labour 
leaders that "if an aggressive attitude was persisted in by 
the Labour Party, Labour could not expect official Liberalism 
to stand on one side ." In a list of threats, Pease went on 
to say that "Liberal legislation has not been in the past, 
nor in the future is likely to be, much influenced by members 
who claim no l~yal ty to the Govermment ... That the issues of 
the next General Election are such that all Liberal, Radical, 
and Labour members can wfule-heartedly unite in supporting . ,, 26 
25Philip Viscount Snowden, An Autobiography, 2 vols. 
(London: Ivo'r Nicholson and Watson, 1934), 1:216. 
26McKibbin, The Evolution ~ pp. 152-53 . 
Not only would the Liberal Party react sharply to any meddling 
by the Labour Party at a time of utmost political delicacy, 
but in a larger sense, they would not allow any further expan-
sion of Labour into new seats . Pease said "That if they (Labour) 
now press L.R.C. candidates for seats which were won by Liberals, 
or Labour members who have not signed the constitution (Lib-
Labs) they must expect retaliatory attacks on their own can-
didates standing for those seats which they now hold.,,27 A 
pragmatist such as a MacDonald could accept this situation. 
But how would the rank and file react to such a whow of weak-
ness and dependence on the part of the leaders of their party? 
The entire question of dependence was of course raised 
after MacDonald's deal with the Liberals in 190). But after 
1909, the problem of political dependence was superseded by 
an even more dangerous possiblity. "By pressing labour and 
social legislation on the Liberal Government the Labour Party 
was enhancing the prestige of the Liberals as a social reform 
party, and weakening the case for independent Labour represen-
tation ... The Labour Party lost no opportunity of claiming 
credit for the Liberal social legislation, but I doubt if 
that argument carried conviction."28 Snowden'S assessment 
of the situation was quite correct. The effect was to exacerbate 
the divisions wi thin the party that had begun at Colne Valley. 
With the National Health Insurance Act in 1911, the socialists 
27McKibbin, p. 153 . 
28Snowden, p . 217 . 
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in the party had yet another reason for disgruntlement . For 
the Act's major feature (which the N.E.C. had gone along with ) 
was that the worker would have to contribute out of his pay 
check for his own insurance. J. Bromley of the Enginemen's 
Federation vocalized the feelings of many when he said his 
union had "become disgusted by this Liberal-Labour represen-
tation; and we have been unable to shut our eyes to the fact 
that our party has tied itself most clo s ely to the Liberal 
Party. "29 At the 1910 I.L.P. conference, Hardie himself 
claimed that the Labour Party had "ceased to count".30 
The results of the January, 1910 election confirmed the 
belief that Labour was strongly dependent on the Liberal 
Party.31 Of seventy-eight candidates who stood, fifty-one 
ran for seats held by Labour at sometime since 1906. Of these 
fifty-one, only three faced Liberal opposition. Twenty-four 
new seats were contested, and only three were won; all three 
being unopposed by the Liberals. Thus, as Neal Blewett con-
tends , Labour had indeed been "contained". The effect of 
this blow to Labour expansion was to reduce the number of 
seats fought in the December election to the bare minimum . 
Only fifty-six were fought and only those in which the party 
had a good chance of winning. Thus , by the end of 1910, La-
bour nationally appeared to be in very bad shape. The party ' s 
29TUC Annual Report (1913) . 
30Marquand, p. 127. 
31N_eal Blewett, The Peers; the Parties and the People 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972},p. 241. 
) 
hands were tied by both the fear of turning the Liberals out 
of the government and the fear of turning themselves out of 
the Commons . 
Several institutional constraints served to entrench 
Labour in its sad predicament. The British electoral system 
was not normally a helpful vehicle for the realignment of 
parties . The British voter was very influenced by the tradi-
tional voting habits of his family.32 The prospects for a 
third party's chances were indeed bleak during this period . 
Naturally, the question of the extent of the franchise arises 
when one -talks of the political system. Only 60% of all adult 
males were qualified to vote. Yet, because of the complexity 
of the registration process and the 12-month residency require-
ment (to say nothing of plural voting), a "roughly represen-
tative" system did in fact conspire against the working class 
and the Labour Party (though whether MacDonald would have 
challenged more seats even with universal suffrage is highly 
debatable).3J All of these impediments were certainly problem-
atic for the Labour Party. But pe~haps the most debilitating 
obstacle came from the courts. 
The financial basis for the Labour Party had of course 
come from the unions. The legality of trade union contribu-
tions for political ~epresentation had never been questioned . 
J2David Butl,er and David Stokes, Political Change in 
Britain (New York: St . Martin's Press, 1971), p. 49. 
33Martin Pugh, Electoral Reform in War and Peace 1906;..18 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp . 3-11 . 
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But in the Osborne Judgement of late 1909 , the courts ruled 
that this practice was illegal. The effect of the judgement 
was not as bad as had been expected. But it certainly hampered 
possible electoral growth. ' The party got around it only by 
reducing its candidatures for the 1910 elections. The loss 
to Labour was at least 20,000 pounds and it caused an imme-
diate loss in membership and created tensions with some unions. 34 
The Osborne Judgement did add to Liberal-Labour antipathy 
as the decision was not reversed until 191J. But it finlly 
forced the Liberals to allow the ~ayment of M. P . s in 1911. 
Thus, the problems of the young Labour Party of 1910 were 
great. The possibility of superseding the Liberal Party within 
a short space of time was all but impossible. Yet, the period 
from 1910 to 1914 did see the beginning of a slow evolution 
in the organization of the party which presented the Liberal 
Party with severe challenges. 
(b)-Stimuli 
In 1906 the Labour Party had almost 1,000,000 members 
out of an electorate of about 7.2 million.J.5 By 1912, this 
number had risen to almost 1.9 million (out of about 7 . .5 
million) and the number of affiliated constituency and central 
parties had jumped from eighty-three to 146. 36 In the January 
1910 election, Labour was able to spend 881 pounds per can-
I. ' 
J4McKibbin, pp. 20-21. 
3.5Butler and Freeman, p . 122 . 
36 ' Ibid., p . 98 . 
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didate compared to 1,075 pounds by the Liberals. In the De-
cember election, 736 pounds was spent compared to the Liberal ' s 
882 pounds per candidate. 37 By '~1i 191 p:, \' I the annual conference 
could boast of sales of over 5.8 million pieces of political 
propaganda. 38 By 1909, the miners had finally voted to affi-
liate with the party. Despite all of these seemingly healthy 
signs of growth, Keir Hardie was forced to admit that: 
•.. we have not yet evolved either the organization 
or the espirit de corps which would enable us to 
cope successfully with our oppoBents.39 
Labour's poor 36.6% of the vote in contested seats was chalked 
up to the Osborne Judgement and the out of date register. 40 
The N.E.C. had a major task in reorganization to make the 
party mechanically sound. MacDonald's goal was to solve three 
major problems. There were still local peculiarities within 
regional parties which led to autonomy and some rebellion 
from the rank and file. Affiliated bodies were not taking 
their responsibilities seriously. Finally, the miners had 
to be reminded that they were now members of the Labour Party.41 
The next four years were to be crucial in the evolution of the 
party. 
In 1911, Arthur Henderson became the secretary of the 
37Blewett, p. 290. 
38Labour Party Conference (1910). 
39Ibid., p. 55. ~QI;t])id. 
41McKibbin,p. 19 . 
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Labour Party . With his arrival , organization was given an 
important jolt and MacDonald's three goals after the elections 
of 1910 were largely achieved . The problem of strengthening 
local parties and making them more uniform was accomplished 
in several ways. Additional agents and national organizers 
were appointed from 1910 to 1914 to canvass local parties 
and insure more efficiency and control. This was made possible 
by the decision to give aid from the Head Office to local 
parties. MacDonald and Henderson were able to insure this 
in 1912 by linking the giving of aid to greater efficiency 
by requiring that applications for financial assistance "be 
accompanied by a complete statement showing the affiliated 
local party ' s composition and details of i ills organization.,,42 
This gave the N.E.C. more control over local parties and cut 
back an local autonomy. Another important development in 
securing uniformity occurred with the founding of central 
parties in both London and Glasgow by 1914. This greatly 
eased the task of organization in these areas. 
The affiliation of the miners in 1909 was of course a 
major achievement. But the miners had been traditional Lib-
Labers and their membership was more nominal than real. They 
refused to work through Labour machinery and were a cause for 
much consternation at Head Office. After 1911, Henderson 
decided it was time to take direct action in forging true 




the by-elections o£ 1910 to 1914 (Hanley in particular ) proved 
the decisive catalysts in moving the miners towards Labour . 
The Liberals re£used to accept mining candidates and this 
along with the changing composition o£ the MFGB leadership 
(Smillie, an I . LP.P.er became the leader in 1911), insured the 
miners' support £or independent Labour representation. As 
yet, this support was patchy, but certainly evident in N. 
Sta££ordshire, Ashton, Durham, and Mid-Derbyshire. 43 
The last area o£ organizational growth dealt with trade 
councils . These industrial groups had not taken their poli-
tical duties seriously be£ore 1910. MacDonald's assistant 
J.S. Middleton verbalized a new view o£ these bodies shared 
by the N.E.C. when he commented that "we at the Head O££ice 
realise to the £ull what oocrellent service the Councils were 
able to render us in the early years. As the political side 
o£ the movement has developed however, it is extremely de-
sirable that these bodies (Local L.R.C.s) should be our points 
of local contact.,,44Thus , a££iliation was in large part trans -
£erred £rom the trade councils to purely political organs. 
By 1914, a££iliation was held by political parties in London , 
Glasgow, Manchester, and Leeds. In 1910, none o£ these areas 
had had a££iliated parties. By 1914, there had indeed been 
a great deal o£ improvement within the Labour machine . With 
this in mind, it is important to examine the state o£ the 
43McKibbin, pp. 26-27. 
44Ibid ., p. 33· 
) 
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relationship between the Liberal and Labour Parties. 
From 1910 to 1914, the Labour Party lost four seats at 
by-elections. In addition, P.F. Clarke has noted that in 
fourteen three-cornered by-elections, Labour finished third. 45 
Pease's threat to prevent any Labour growth seems to have 
been realized in these results. Yet,the result of these 
electoral losses actually helped the Labour Party. For this 
Liberal antagonism seriously dampened their relationship with 
Labour. Though MacDonald was successful in maintaining cor-
dial relations nationally with the Liberals, the rank and 
file was slowly beginning to gain a stronger consciousness 
of being part of the Labour Party. The question of tracing 
this consciousness to the growth of the worker discussed in 
chapter one ia difficult, but was certainly important. For 
the purposes of this chapter, it will be sufficient to examine 
the accidental causes of this consciousness. 
The four by-election losses suffered by Labour before 
the war were all actually quite peculiar. Other than Bow 
and Bromley (where George Lansbury fought the entire campaign 
as an Independent on the votes for women question), all of 
the losses occurred in mining constituencies in the Midlands 
and served not only to alienate the traditionally Liberal 
miners from the Liberal Pa~ty but also to confirm the belief 
uf much of the rank and file that an alliance with the Liberals 
45p.F. · Clarke.,. "The ElectGral Position of the Liberal 
and Labour Parties.t. 1910-14", The English Historical Review 
90 (October, 1975);Sj1 ; 
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was not desirable . Even af'ter the f'irst General Election of' 
1910, it was bluntly stated that "The treatment meted out to 
our candidates by the Liberals during the recent contest was 
not of' a kind to predispose us towards any undue f'riendly 
relationships . ,,46 
In June of' 1912 , Enoch Edwards, the president of' the 
Miner's Federation and the Labour M.P. a t Hanley died. Though 
he was at heart a Liberal, Edwards had maintained a cordial 
relationship with Labour. With his death, the Liberals put 
up their own dandidate shocking the entire Labour Party. At 
the same time, the Liberal M.P. at Crewe died, and in revenge 
the Labour Party decided to f'ight that seat as well . Labour, 
as expected f'ared poorly at Hanley and xhe Liberals barely 
w(')n. RuT. T.hA T,Fth(,)llr ; nT.ArVAYlT.i (')Yl aT. r.rAwA 1 (')flT. thA T,; hAr::l l l=l 
an important seat. Af'ter t he by-elections were over, The 
Times hoped that "it may be in the growing intractability of' 
the Labour Party we are witnessing the beginning of' the end 
of the coalition . ,,47 And the LabQ!!r. Leader gleef'ully exclaimed 
that Hanley "means the death-blow of' Liberal-Labourism as a 
national f'orce.,,48 Though these analyses were extreme, it 
did seem as if' Hanley was symbolic of' a growing disgust with 
accommddatr0rl-. The res.ul ts of' the by-elections at Chesterf'ield 
and N.E. Derbyshire exacerbated this f'eeling and killed Lib-
Labism in many people ' s minds by World War I. 
46Labour Party Conference (1910). 




The "Kenyon Aff'air" at Chesterf'ield dealt a serious blow 
to Lib-Labism. Barnet Kenyon was a traditional Lib-Laber who 
was put f'orward by the Derbyshire miners as the Labour candi -
date f'or Chesterf'ield in August, 1913. When Kenyon ref'used 
to sign the party constitution, MacDonald and the MFGB ref'used 
to endorsehhis candidacy. Kenyon was elected and actually 
agreed to accept the Labour whip. However, in January , 1914, 
Kenyon suddenly resigned f'rom the Labour Party and was roundly 
condemned. The Derbyshire miners, who had supported Kenyon 
throughout his escapades, promised that the entire af'f'air 
would~not be repeated. 
The by-election in May, 1914 at N.E. Derbyshire was the 
f'inal blow to Derbyshire Lib-Labism. When the Lib-Lab M. P . 
died, leaving a vacancy, the miners nominated a new man, 
James Martin. He was in reality a Liberal, but since the 
Kenyon afair, he had been a loyal Labour supporter. The 
Liberals ref'used to support him and put up their own man . 
The result was to give the Conservatives the seat. Along 
with the ef'f'ects of' the coal strikes of' 1912, the by-elections 
served to unif'y the miners and bind them more closely with 
the Labour Party. Perhaps the most telling statement on the 
nature of' Lib-Labism came in the midst of' the N.E. Derbyshire 
by-election f'romMacDonald.himself' . He said that the Liberals : 
.•• did it at Hanley and won. It is the most expen-
sive victory Liberalism has had within this genera-
tion. They have lost f'ive or six seats as a result 
of' their actions (actually f'ourJ ... What imperti-
nence! •.. We have the seat. The Labour Party is 
going to grow . It is not going to accept its pre-
sent strength as its f'inal strength. It is going 
to contest constituencies, where it has got a hold, 
and the convenience of no party will deter us. 4 9 
MacDonald's strong oratory was of course in the heat of an 
election campaign and should not be considered to represent 
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a drastic turn-around in N.E.C. strategy. Yet, it does show 
the tensions that were beginning to surface during this period. 
In other mining constituencies, the N.E.C. tried to maintain 
Lib-Lab agreements . Yet, the general rank and file was be-
ginning to tire of cooperation and strongly fought to challenge 
accommodation. The two examples of this were at the Leicester 
and KeighlY by-elections of 1913. 
Leicester was particularly sensitive because it was a 
double constituency where MacDonald had one seat and the 
Liberals the other. When the Liberal died, the local Labour 
Party decided to fight for the seat. After much intrigue 
and questionable tactics, MacDonald was ablee to secure the 
removal of the Labour man. Yet, the Executive's active inter-
ference sent shock waves through the local Leicester organi-
zation and the entire episode showed that a future pact with 
the Liberals would be difficult to impose on the rank and file. 
The difficulty of reconciling national politics with the 
wishes of the rank and file was a serious problem. MacDonald ' s 
comments during the N. E. Derbyshire by-election revealed that 
even he was beginning to have his doubts primarily because 
of Liberal intransigence . 
In late 191), KeighJJu came up for a by-election and 
49McKibbin, pp. 61-62 . 
) 
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again the rank and file demanded a Labour candidate. Hen-
derson went to Keigh~ and was persuaded that the majority 
of the members were strongly in support of this candidature . 
Subsequently, the N.E.C. did give its approval. The reasons 
for this endorsement ranged from the desire to avotd another 
Leicester and more importantly , as Clynes put it, to give 
"proof of the independence and self-contained position of 
the Party ~oth in the House of Commons and the country.,,50 
Thus, by the outbreak of World War I, the self-restraint 
which had characterized Lib-Labism before 1910 seemed to be 
on the wane. Whether or not the alliance itself had broken 
down is doubtful. Yet , the Liberal loyalties of much of the 
rank and file had been seriously questioned. As Ross McKibbin 
has put it: 
.•. the growing intractability of Labour was (not) 
primarily ideological or even connected with speci-
fically objectionable policies of the Liberal gov-
ernment. It is possible, though difficult to prove, 
that the industrial disturbances of 1911 813 contri-
buted to militancy in the rank and file which, in 
turn, made local parties less willing to stand aside 
for Liberal candidates. Yet this was perhaps less 
fundamental than a growing feeling in the country 
that the Liberal Party was no longer the party of 
the working classes, but that '00 the Labour Party 
was. 51 
Conclusion 
The period between the Memorial Hall Conference and Sara-
j evo saw the growth of the Labour Party from childhood to 
50McKibbin, p. 69 . 





adolescence . The childhood can be construed as occurring 
£rom 1900 to 1910 and the adolescence £rom 1910 to 1914 . The 
pro,l!>lems o£ the early Labour Party , coherence, control , and 
independence had £or the most part reached a critical juncture 
by 1914. The problem o£ coherence was solved by not £acing 
the issue o£ ideology at all. As the trade unions numerically 
exerted more and more in£luence on the party, the N.E.C. was 
able to transcend the di££iculties o£ the alliance £orged in 
1900 through the tactic o£ ambiguity . 
The problem o£ control had been acute be£ore 1910 most 
clearly illustrated in Ben Tillett's resolution o£ 1905 and 
the challenge o£ Victor Grayson. The N.E.C. was able to solve 
these problems through shrewd manipulation and the general 
consolidation o£ its power through the use o£ aid £or local 
parties, the trans£erral o£ a££iliation £rom trade councils 
to local L.R . C.s, the establishment o£ central parties in 
Glasgow and London, and the setting up o£ regional organiza-
tion in Scotland. Thoggh Leicester was an example o£ continual 
dissatis£action with the N.E.C . , there is no doubt that Mac -
Donald and Henderson were able to wield e££ective control 
a£ter 1910. The militant socialist element in the party was 
in the minority and t~e .. het:erpgeneous nature o£ trade und.:on-
ism enabled the N.E.C. to keep most £actions o££ balance and 
to thus control the party and its direction. 
With regard to independence, it was evident that the 
rank and £ile, spurred on by the militancy o£ the period, was 
£ar more eager to break its ties with the Liberal Party than 
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was the Executive . The experiences at by-elections, " the 
action of the Government over the railway strike and the 
miners' strike",52 the delay in the reversal of the Osborne 
Judgement, and the general antipathy towards the Liberals 
after 1910 all served to demonstrate the need for independent 
Labour representation. Lib-Labism as it had been known in 
the coal-fields and other prominent working class areas was 
close to completely rupturing. The N.E.C. reacted to this 
growing disillusionment by trying to temper and control the 
speed of such a fracture for politically expedient reasons. 
An immediate break off would certainly deal a serious blow 
to the party ' s fortunes. Thus, the N.E.C. was certainly 
moving more towards the rank and file, but was not ready to 
completely abandon cooperation. 
The position of the Labour Party by 1914 has been seen 
by most commentators as one of weakness. C~arke has examined 
the by-elections of 1910 to 1914 to show the abysmal condi -
tion of Labour at the national polls . It is helpful to note 
McKibbin ' s rebuttal to this argument . Taking into account 
the fact that the party was but ten years old and still oper-
ating under many handicaps, McKibbin has c.argued that the 
best way to look at Labo~r ' .~ performance is not to compare 
the results too closely with the other parties. Instead it 
is more helpful to compare the by-election results where 
possible with the 1910 General Election totals . In these 
52McKibbin, p . 65 . 
) 
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five seats (N.E. Lanarkshire, Holmfirth, Crewe, Keighl\y c and 
Leith), Labour impvoved its total in all the constituencies . 
Labour's entry cost the Liberal ' s seats in Crewe and Leith, 
and their poll in Holmfirth and KeighlY was almost equal to 
that of the Conservatives. This argument at best only suggests 
that though Labour did finish last, they were not doing abys-
mally. In the seven seats contested for the first time in 
by-elections, Labour's showing at Oldham , Midlothian, and 
S. Lanark was good enough to give the Conservatives the gain . 
Labour's poll at N.W. Durham , Houghton-Ie-Spring, and Keighl~ 
was remarkably good. The Keighl~ by-election of 1913 showed 
a Labour imp~ovement from 1911. Though these results do not 
reveal the triumph of Labour, they do suggest some severe 
Liberal difficulty because of Labour. 53 
From the standpoint of organization growth , George Askwith 
noted that in the Labour Party, a "sense of greater strength 
came, too, by the vast increase of membership in the unions 
especially dealing with the semi-skilled and unskilled work-
people, as a result due partly to the systematic organisation , 
partly to the requirement of the National Insurarroee Act that 
wage-earners should belong to an approved society.".54 In 
addition, the payment of M.P.s and the Trades Union Act of 
1913 greatly reduced the financial burden on the party which 
was reflected in the appointment of national organizers, the 
.53McKibbin, p. 29 . 
54 Askwi th, p. 355 .' 
82 
extension of the Head Office, and the beginning of financial 
aid to local parties. The relationship between the TUC and 
the party generally improved in the period as well. In 1913, 
a Joint Board was established so that the TUC, the General 
Federation of Trade Unions, and the Labour Party would meet 
in the same building to better coordinate united political 
action. 55 Also in 1913, the TUC passed with only three dissents, 
a resolutio·n in favor of financial aid for the Labour Party 
in response to the requirements of the Trades Union Act which 
allowed a union to "contract-out" if it wished. The effects 
of the mining by-elections aided union support. The MFGB under 
Smillie became one of the party's loyalist and strongest su-
pporters. Perhaps even more helpful in establishing a greater 
rapport between the unions and the party was the effect of 
the industrial disturbances of the period. 
In his history of Industrial Problems and Disputes, Lord 
Askwith noted "the inter· ference of politicians in Labour 
disputes, much as many of them hankered to come in, was r: dele -
terious, and could be exposed far more strongly than I have 
suggested. ,,56 This comment was in particular :cweferring to 
the London Dock strike of 1912 when .:five cabinet minsters 
attempted to settle the dispute and ended up antagonizing 
both sides. In one of the many transport strikes of the 
period, Lloyd George successfully appealed to the Agadir 
imbroglio as a t'IAI;'OC') ~.... unity to end the strike} alienating 
55TUC Annual Report (1913) . 
56Askwith, p. 353. 
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many workers . In response to the miner's Minimum Wage Act 
of 1912 , Asquith tersely referred to the Act as "A provisional 
and, t o some extent, as an experimental measure to meet a 
special emergency in regard to a particular class of workers 
working under peculiar conditions in one great industry."57 
This was certainly not the statement of a "New Liberal". The 
most inflammatory gesture was the government's use and threat 
of police and military in the industrial disputes. In re-
ferring to Churchill and the government's actions during the 
S. Wales Miner's Strike and the London Transport Worker's 
Strike, Ben Tillett called Churchill a "modern Nero". He 
went on to say that the "suppression by violence of our good 
fellows in all of the port fights ... (is) terrible enough as 
a handicap for even a Tory Government; but for one who is a 
Liberal ... it is indeed an impeachment to recall the misera-
ble episodes of the fight where Labour had the millstone of 
capitalist repression about its neck."58 Even MacDonald con-
demned the government for threatening military action in the 
summer of 1911.59 Thus, by 1914, because of greater organ-
ization, the actions of the government, and a growing working 
class consciousness, it is safe to say that the relationship 
between the unions and the Labour Party, though not ideal , 
was becoming increasingly closer and harmonious . 
57The Times, 3 November 1913 . 
58Tillett, p. 34. 
59Hansard, August, 1911 . 
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The last area to examine is where Lib-Labism stood by 
1914 . Since early 1910, the Liberals (the Master of Elibank 
in particular) had approached MacDonald many times to discuss 
the possibility of forming a coalition. Typical of these 
gestures was a letter from Lloyd George to MacDonald on March 
3, 1913 · 
My dear Ramsay, 
I want to have a serious talk with you about 
the relations of Liberalism and Labour. If we go 
on as we have been doing during the last couple of 
years more especially, both your Party and ours will 
meet with the worst disaster which has be~allen us. 60 
In 1912, Elibank asked MacDonald if he would "not join the 
cabinet"? MacDonald's reply was "that it was out of the 
question for two reasons. 1 . I was not prepared to support 
the Govt . through thick and thin. 2. It would do great evil 
to the Labour Party.,,61 It is difficult to go too far in 
estimating the finality of MacDonald's intentions . Yet , his 
speech during the N.E. Derbyshire by-election was quite strong 
and after Labour had revenged their loss by fighting at Ipswich 
( causing a Conservative gain), he noted on May 29th that : 
The Conservatives will ... continue their attempts 
to get a Parliamentary majority on minority votes, 
and if the Liberals ask us to prevent that by giving 
them every seat they want, the Conservatives will 
succeed, for we will agree to no such proposal. If 
the Liberals run candidates against us they can do 
so, and when that policy of stupidity has ended in 
devastation we will ask them how it pleases them. 
If that should come we shall @egin to build up again 
with the knowledge that we shall be in a far better 
position than the Liberals themselves to make good 
60Marquand, p . 159 . 
61Ibid., 151 . 
our losses, and that in this country , as on the 
continent, the fight ~ .• will then be between a great 
Labour Party and a strong reactionary party, with 
a small Liberal Party standing between, cut off 
from every source of inspiration and opportunity of 
growth. 62 . 
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Thus , at the Executive level, the question of continued coop-
eration was seriously being questioned. MacDonald and Hen-
derson were the most open of the N.E.C. towards a s renewal of 
a pact . But even MacDonald seems to be speaking with more 
confidence and militancy by the outbreak of the Great War. 
While it is difficult to make any national prognosis, it is 
easy to see a general disaffection at the local level . For 
a variety of reasons which will be seen in the next chapter , 
the rank and file would not react favora@ly to any further 
accommodation. 
Thus, the Labour Party throughout the period continued 
to gain momentum. When it was a lesser force before 1910, 
it was naturally easier to gain concessions from the Liberal 
Party . Yet, as the party grew in numbers and power through 
191~, opposition stiffened . The amazing results of 1906 were 
not duplicated or built on before the war. But it should 
not be expected that a young party which was growing asa 
threat to the Liberals should be allowed to expand. Consi -
dering this, the electoral results after 1910 should not be 
viewed as poor showings. Rather, it was remarkable that 
Labour fared as well as it did. The institutionalization 
of the Labour Party in 190J (revealed in 1906) became more 
62Marquand, p. 162 . 
,) 
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and more ingrained within the workingman ' s mind . Habits be -
gan to form in areas where the party was allowed to grow and 
the events of 1910 to 1914 served to reinforce these trends 
with an added vigor. By 1914 it was impossible to say whether 
, ' 
, ' ' 
or not Labour would succeed Liberalism. ' ' However, it is possi-
ble to say, from the result of the by-elections alone, that 
Labour had become a real threat to the Liberals . Though the 
Liberal and Labour Parties did not differ ideologically, their 
membership and motives were radically different. The growing 
disenchantment of the working class and their own conserva-
tive rank and file would prove to be the Liberal's greatest 
challenge . How they would handle it is unfortunately unknown , 
for after August 1914, came the deluge ; swamping Europe and 
drowning the Liberal Party . 
J 
CRliPTER III 
Patterns of Disenchantment 
To reduce the Liberal Party to a definition would 
be like attempting to reduce the glandular contours 
of a circus Fat Lady by simply talking her thin. 
It was an irrational mixture of whig aristocrats, 
industrialists, dissenters, reformers, trade union-
ists, quacks and Mr. Lloyd George. 
(George Dangerfield, Strange Death, p . 72) 
The National Picture 
After their victory in the December election of 1910 , 
or.\"l 
the Liberals became· the s-..~ party in English history to 
win three successive General Elections . The position of the 
Conservative Party was indeed bleak. After the December 
election, the Unionists were badly split. At Albert Hall , 
the leader of the Conservative Party Arthur Balfour ruptured 
the fragile unity that had only been maintained by party-
wide opposition to the "People ' s Budget". By coming out 
strongly for Tariff Reform, it was "no longer possible or 
desirable to ignore the gravity of the situation which the 
Unionist Party has drifted in the past fortnight. ,,1 The lea-
dership waS discredited and after losing a third consecutive 
General Election, the Liberal leadership felt that the position 
l Blewett, p . 20J . 
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of the Tories had never been worse . 2 Thus, from the perspec -
tive of 1910, it was the Conservative and not the Liberal 
Party which appeared to be on its deathbed. 
After the passage of the Parliament Act in 1911, the 
Liberal Party was forced to repay the Irish Nationalists for 
their strong support throughout 1909 and 1910. Irish Home 
Rule , the issue that had consumed the Liberal Party in the 
last part of the nineteenth century once again raised its 
menacing head after the summer of 1911. The Nationalists 
held eighty-four seats in the Parliament of 1911. With the 
Liberals holding 272 seats to the Unionists 271, the impor-
tance of the Nationalists becomes apparent. It was critical 
not to alienate the Irish during this period of utmost impor-
tance in constitutional and social history. For this reason, 
Home Rule was proceeded with leading to many unsettling events. 
In Ireland, Carson's Ulstermen threatened Civil War. To a 
badly divided Unionist Party, the Irish imbroglio offered an 
issue. Yet, the actions of F.E. Smith and Bonar Law seemed 
seditious and split the Conservatives even further. The 
Liberal Party was in a quandary. Could war in Ireland be 
risked or should some type of compromise be attempted which 
might anger Redmond and topple the government'? 
The period 1910 to 1914 must be viewed in this context . 
The position of both the Conservatives and Nationalists was 
much more doubtful and elicited far more concern than the 
position of the Labour Party . To most informed observers of 
2Blewett , p. 201. 
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the day, the containment of Labour in 1910 and the pressing 
constitutional issues of the day seemed to suggest the pro-
bability of further Labour cooperation. Though the Liberal 
Party was indeed G~pendent on Labour and Irish support, the 
threat posed by Labour was not considered to be serious. In 
fact, the Liberal Party seemed to have quelled the rising 
tide of working class consciousness by absorbing it.J With 
this background in mind, it is necessary to examine the speci -
fic condition of the Liberal Party from 1910 to 1914. For 
it will be argued, that the immediate crises of the day were 
far less sign.ificant for the future of the Liberal Party than 
the potentially catastrophic possibilities engendered by 
continually deteriorating relations with the Labour Party. 
From 1910 to 1914, the Liberal Party suffered fifteen 
by-election losses to the Conservative Party. Of those fif-
teen losses, eight can be attributed to the intervention of 
the Labour Party and another to the Liberal-Labour split. 
An examination of several of these by-elections will help 
illuminate the condition of the Liberal Party during these 
years. 
The Liberal losses of Cheltenham and S. Somerset in 
early 1911, while not critical in themselves, did reveal the 
deficiencies of Liberal organization in rural areas . Though 
these constituencies had been marginal mainly because of the 
free trade issue, they seemed to be representative of the 
JS ee P.F. Clarke, Lancashire and the New Liberalism. ----
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decay of the Liberal machine in the south .4 The loss of 
Oldham in 1911 was one of the most troubling signs of Liberal -
Labour problems . In a town which was fought for the first 
time by Labour, the result saw 12,255 votes cast for the 
Unionists, 10,623 for the Liberals, and an astounding 7 ,448 
for the Labour Party .5 MacDonald noted in his diary that 
the "Liberals (were) very angry about Oldham. Long inter-
view with Elibank who says Premier very much upset . ,, 6 . 
The losses of Manchester South and Manchester Northwest 
within a few months of each other in 1912 were primarily due 
to the reaction against the National Health Insurance Act of 
1911. These losses were indeed ominou~ as Manchester as of 
1910 had appeared to be the center of the revival of Liberalism 
in the Northwest. 7 Both of these constituencies were mainly 
middle-class and business oriented , and their loss was sym-
bolic of the growing discontent of the traditional adherents 
of Liberalism. The Liberals lost Crewe in July of 1912 as 
"the Labour revolt let in the Unionist. ,,8 Crewe, which was 
normally a safe Liberal seat, was beginning to typify the 
destructive results of local intransigence to both Liberal 
4Blewett, p. 282 . 
5The Times, 14 November 1911. 
6Marquand, p. 142 . 
7Henry Pelling, Social Geography of British Elections: 
188.5-1910 (London: . MacMillan, 1967), p. 282 . 
8The Annual Register (1912), p. 192 . 
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and Labour Parties . 9 Perhaps even more damaging was the loss 
oi' Edinburgh to the Conservatives. A traditional home of 
the Liberals, the Midlothian stronghold had not been lost in 
thirty-eight years. lO The entrance of Labour certainly hurt 
the Liberals as the vote went 6,021 cast for the Unionists , 
5,989 i'or the Liberals, and 2,400 i'or Labour. The Annual 
Regfuster sheds further light on this contest. Mr. Outhwaite , 
the new Liberal M.P. from Hanley, "declared that landowners 
should be taxed out oi' existence and the Whigs expelled i'rom 
the Liberal Party."l l This comment reveals a clear potential 
for a cleavage between the 'new' Liberals and the traditional 
wealthy contributors to the party. 
The loss of Reading on November 8 , 1913 came in the midst 
of extreme tensions over Home Rule. The lunatic Larkin was 
being prosecuted at the time. At the Linlithgow by-election 
which occurred simultaneously , Labour leaders advised working-
men to vote Conservative .. The result was a reduction of over 
1,000 votes from the General Election and a hair-thin win by 
the Liberals. This slirr victory was made even more remarkable 
by the presence of a large Irish Nationalist vote. 12 The 
Socialist intervention at Reading cost the Liberals the seat 
and is a clear example of the growing willingness of Labour 
9Pelling, Geography, p. 282 . 
10The Times, 10 September 1912. -----
1iThe Annual Register (1 912 ), p . 206. 
i2Ibid. (1913), p . 227 . 
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rank and file to ;-idefeat the government. The appearance for 
the first time of a Labour candidate in S. Iianarkshire saw a 
surprisingly strong performance and caused a Liberal 10ss.13 
With the defection of Bethnal Green in London to the 
Conservative ranks in February of 1914, the 8severity of the 
Liberal-Labour split became evident. Masterman, who had 
just entered the cabinet, was defeated by twenty-four votes 
because of Labour infiltration. 14 Bethnal Green was oneeof 
the last __ ~w in London which had remained Liberal during 
a disastrous decay in the capital . Leith Burgs, a constit-
uency which had "been faithful to Liberalism since the passing 
of the Reform Act of 18)2 and [was) regarded by the Govern-
ment as safe" followed suit in the continuing Liberal-Labour 
split. 15 The vote showed 5,159 for the Unionists, 5,143 for 
the Liberals, and 3,)46 for Labour. Not only had Labour cost 
the government another seat, but the campaign had been marked 
by strong anti-Labour speeches by the Liberal candidate. 
The N.E. Derbyshire by-election of May 20, 1914 has already 
been discussed. The final turnover came three days later at 
Ipswich when Masterman was again defeated because of Labour 
intervention. The peak of acrimony that had been reached 
by this date has been documented in MacDonald's strong oratory. 16 
Thus, this rapid overview of by-elections has revealed three 
1)The Tim~1 February, 1914. 
14Ibid., 25 February 1914. 
15:tft\J. ~ f~. ~ '(U~~ 
l"~ ~rr) p.~~. 
fundamental challenges to the future of the Liberal Party . 
These three problems can be stated in the following terms. 
1 ) The decay of the Liberal machinery in certain 
parts of the United Kingdom. 
2) The difficulty of retaining middle-class support 
while at the same time appealing to working class 
voters. 
3) The increasingly dire condition of the so-called 
"progressive coalition" between the Liberal and La-
bour Party by the outbreak of World War I. 
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Before examining these three proposition, several clari-
fications are in order. The alleged problems in Liberal 
organization were by no means new. Man~ of the difficul -
ties that will be discussed had plagued the party well before 
the turn of the century. In fact, there had been many attempts 
to remedy these deficiencies. The difficulty of retaining 
middle-class backing was also not new. The Liberal Party 
had been willing to shed its right wing before (1886). Lloyd 
George's desire to ria the party of its more conservative 
adherents was not peculiar to the period in question. What 
was new was the increasingly deteriorating relationship be-
tween the Liberal and Labour Party. The reason for examining 
the first two problems is that they both tended to exacer-
bate Lib-Lab relations. Yet, the disint~ gration in progressi -
vism also affected the problems with organization and main-
taining traditional Liberal supporters. All three areas must 
be critically examined in order to properly evaluate the ac -
tual political position of the Liberal Party as of 1914. 
Finally, by-elections are not General Elections. Though they 
are helpful in isolating certain trends, by-elections do not 
present the same circumstances as General Elections. The two 
are fought in a different climate and have different rules of 
the game. Yet, by-elections do provide some insight into 
certain trends which are important and not hidden by the 
expediencies of General Elections. 
The first proposition is at best tenuous, and at worst 
impossible to prove because of the difficulty of the hypo-
thesizing connected with ignoring the Great War. Whether 
or not these deficiencies had become permanent prior to 1914 
is impossible to say. Yet, it can be established, from three 
regional studies, that there were some concrete problems 
within the Liberal machine. The most obvious example was in 
London and the Southeast in general. This area had been 
lost to the Liberals since before 1900. Though the decay in 
the capital was an old story, it did reveal some of the pro-
blems the party had not solved before the war. Paul Thompson ' s 
Socialists, Liberals, and Labour clearly reveals the dilapi-
dated condition of constituency organization. Other than in 
the more well-to-do suburban areas, there was little money for 
active canvassing for registration. In fact, most canvassers 
had to be brought in from out of the constituencies to do 
the work as most working class areas were unable to provide 
enough workers at elections. 17 The results were obvious. 
Except for 1906, an anomalous election, the results in London 
and the Southeast proved disastrous. Most Liberal voting in 
17Paul Thompson, .Socialists, Liberals, and Labour (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), pp. 176-77· 
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1910 seems to have come from the middle - class and not working-
men. Thus, Thompson claims that the Liberals in London amounted 
to little more than a party of interests without a creed and 
lacking the firm support of the working class in a period 
when politics were becoming more and more class-oariented. 18 
According to Kenneth O. Morgan, the situation in Wales 
was as potentially serious as in London . Morgan claims that 
Wales remained Liberal until the war solely because of the 
strong pull of its traditional radical past. Party machinery 
at the constituency level was crumbling. The major examples 
of this occurred in Merthyr, Rhondda, and Glamorgan . 19 The 
I.L.P. began slowly to penetrate Wales before the war. As 
religion began to decline as a focal point and economic issues 
became increasingly pressing , the political situation in 
Wales was slowly transformed . 20 Thus, the challenge to Li -
beralism was to reinvigorate a political machine which was 
successful only because of its historic grip on the region 
and not because of its efficiency . 
Though it is difficult to go very much further in this 
study of organization, it is necessary to point out a few 
other problems. The financial backing of the Liberal Party 
had historically come from middle-class Nonconformists and 
18Thompson, p. 176 . 
19Kenneth O. Morgan, Wales in British Politics 1868-1922 
(Cardiff, S. Wales: University of Wales Press, 19b3), pp. 243-46 . 
20Cyril Parry, "Gwynedd Politics, 1900-1920: The Rise 
of the Labour Party," Welsh History Review 6 (June, 197.3) · 
) 
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free traders . Before 1906 , one of the major prerequisites 
for a potential candidate was his ability to foot most of 
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his own expenses. In Lancashire and the New Liberalism, P .F . 
Clarke asserts that this situation began to change as the 
Liberal Party became more dependent on working class votes . 
The burden of electoral expenses began to fall even more 
heavily on the Chief Whip. The Liberals had attempted a na-
tional fund drive for many small subscriptions (c. 1901) which 
had failed . A few large donors had always been easier to 
depend on. The Manchester Guardian asked "what would be the 
state of the Liberal Party chest if it depended on the volun-
tary subscriptions of the rank and file?"21 Loreburn felt 
that t he organization was "kept going solely by the sale of 
honours . ,,22 
Between 1908 and 1911, the NLF (National Liberal Feder-
ation) reorganized its national organization to meet the 
needs of the new political situation. Regional Districts 
were established to insure greater centralization and cohe -
sion . In areas such as Manchester and Oldham, this strate-
gy paid off as these locales became supportive of the national 
policy of progressivism. Yet, before 1914, these two towns 
were more the exception than the rule. Cecil Beck, a Liberal 
organizer claimed that the party lacked "co-ordination and 
planning. ,,23 There was an enormous amount of friction be-
21Clarke, Lancashire, p. 216 . 22Ibid . 
23v.H .. Emy, Liberals , Radicals and Social: Politics 
( Cambridge : C.U . P ., 1973 ), pp. 285-87. 
tween the constituencies and whips. The Liberal Party had 
adapted ideologically and structurally to a new situation . 
Yet, the party itself had changed little . The continued 
reliance on a few large donors evidenced the fact that old 
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practices were continuing. In comparison, the Labour Party ' s 
organization was becoming more and more based on the trade 
unions. Fabian and I.L.P. influence had been greatly dimi-
nished by 1914. This held no small importance for the future . 
The working cmass was directly responsible for the running 
of its party and local and national coordination, while not 
perfect, was steadily improving through 1914. Meanwhile, the 
"New Liberal Party" which was to appeal to working class :i7o:tes for 
a 'f'8 new base of support , gave little control to its new con-
stituency. 
The second proposition naturally followsfrom the first . 
If a "new Liberalism" was evolving, how would the more conser-
vative wing of the party react? There is little doubt that 
several conservative members left the party after 1909. After 
:rol'Mtoo~ 
the"election of 1910 , Lewis Harcourt "found allover the 
country that all LLloyd George's speeches and Winston's ear-
lier ones ... had done us much harm with advanced men of the 
lower middle-class ... and probably account for the heavy losses 
in the south.,,24 Herbert Samuel summed up the true challenge. 
The debacle in the Home Counties and in so many 
agricultural divisions is lamentable. It is the 
abiding problem of Liberal statesmanship to rouse 
the enthusiasm of the working classes without frigh-
24Emy , p . 236 . 
tening the middle classes. It can be done but it 
has not been done this time. 25 
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There was a significant turnover of the more "whiggish" ele-
ment in the party.26 Though until 1914 the actual degree of 
division was minimal, there was a hard-core group of conser-
vative Liberals who consistently abstained on the major so-
cial issues of the day.27 The relative lack of dissent can 
be accounted for when one realizes the precarious position 
the government was in from 1910 to 1914. Dependence on the 
Irish and Labour has been noted at''''ld voting against the govern-
ment could conceivably bring it down. In a sense, both the 
Labour Party and the conservative Liberals were in a similar 
predicament as they both shared the fate of having their 
hands tied. Though this was true at the parliamentary level, 
it was not necessarily valid locally. The classic example 
of this was in the West Riding in Yorkshire where Liberalism 
and Nonconformity happened to be the outlook of the large 
employers of labour. 28 The most obvious case was at Bradford 
where Alfred Illingworth tenaciously clung to his local power . 
The results of this were seen in the remarkable growth of the 
25Emy , p. 236 . 
26The loss of middle-class support however does not dic-
tate a loss in money. Wealthy donors could continue to seek 
honours and contribute to the party coffers regardless of 
actual ideology or faith in the party. See Lloyd George ' s 
slush fund and the state of Liberal finances after 1920. 
27Nancy Thompson, "The New Liberalism: 1906-1914: An 
Analys.is of its Impact upon British Politics, Policies and 
People: "(Honors Thesis, Oberlin College , 1978) . 
28Glaser, "Nonconformity", p . 354. 
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I.L. P . after 1890. 29 
The third proposition was the most serious challenge to 
the future of Liberalism. The relationship with the Labour 
Party had been defined by the nature of the 1903 pact. Li-
beralism was able to steer much of the new working class con-
sciousness into its camp through this pact . 30 From the per-
spective of 1910, it can be as easily argued that the pact 
helped the Liberals more than it helped the Labour Party as 
compared to the opposite and usual interpretation. We have 
already viewed the condition of Lib-Labism from the Labour 
vantage point. From the Liberal perspective, the experiences 
with Labour from 1910 to 1914 were more ominous than most 
contemporaries acknowledged. The loss of parliamentary seats 
because of Labour intervention and their remarkably strong 
poll in many of these areas was quite alarming. In the months 
immediately before the war, the Liberal leadership finally 
began to vocalize some concern over the breakdown of the pro -
gressive coalition. On April 4, 1914, Asquith admitted that 
all of the government ' s losses at by-elections in the previous 
two years ( except for Reading-which was lost because of So-
cialist intervention and not by official N.E.C. instructions) 
were due to the "split in the forces of progressivism. " It 
was indeed a pity that the "democratic army (was) split assun-
der in the face of the common enemy. lI ~ In June, Lloyd George 
29J. Reynolds and K. Laybourn, "The Eniergence of the Inde-
pendent Labour Party in Bradford", International Review of 
So'cia}: History 20 (1975), p. 331. 
30Thompson , p . 295. 
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stated that the "disunion in our own ranks (alluding to Lib-
Lab relations) " was "the great rock in f'rontof' us (Liberals). "3'. 
Of' course a word should be said f'or progressivism. P.F. 
Clarke has identified certain important attitudes that many 
"New Liberals" held. C.P. Scott and the Guardian attempted 
to f'orge a progressive coalition in Manchester. This was suc -
cessf'ul in the General Election of' 1910. Wigan and Oldham 
were two other examples of successful Lancashire progressivism . 
However, Clarke ' s conclusions are for the most part gross 
generalizations which are more true for radical leaders than 
the Liberr-al Party as a whole . Just because a "New Liberalism " 
was espoused did not mean it would be accepted. 
The national condition of the Liberal Party in 1914 was 
a t best questionable. The f'irst two problems could be reme-
died and f'rom the perspective of Westminster seemed trivial 
in view of the upheavals of' the period and compared with the 
apparent dif'ficulties of' the Unionis t camp. The last propo-
sition was f'ar more serious and yet, once again f'rom a national 
s t and point, appeared less dangerous :::; than it actually was . 
The problems::: that have been isolated are of' course magnif'ied 
at the local level. Not only were tensions in organization, 
composi tion, and cooperation obvious, but these probbi!IDS were 
actually translated into the electoral situation. Thus, it 
become!3 necessary to turn our attention to the dif·ficul t, 
e l usive, and for the most part untouched topic of local politics . 
31Martin Petter, "The Progressive Alliance ", History 58 
(February, 1973), p . 57· 
J 
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The Local Situation 
The area of Municipal Elections presents an intriguing 
challenge to the political historian. These elections gave 
the Labour Party an opportunity to contest areas free from 
the constraints of parliamentary contests. For this reason, 
these elections were taken very seriously and gave local 
organs the chance to put their machines to the test. Since 
the power of Head Office was not normally able to reach this 
level of politics, constituency organizations were more eager 
to nominate candidates. 32 
Before examining some results, it is imperative to make 
certain explanations and essential qualifications about the 
nature of local politics. Municipal Elections are not national 
politics through a looking-glass ~ The way the electorate 
voted in these contests does not provide definitive answers 
to national political questions. It was only now that these 
elections came to be fought along party lines. These contests 
were not always fought on polit ical issues either. The func -
tion $ £ these elections was to elect municipal councils. The 
two majO'r areas of business for the councils were public 
health and education. 
"Municipal Corporations are governed by councils consis -
ting of the mayor, aldermen, and councillors . ,,33 These contests 
elected only the councillors. The mayor and aldermen were 
32Mckibbin, pp. 84-85. 
33The Municipal Yearbook (1913), p. 7· 
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selected by and from these officials . A councillor came up 
for election every three years. To be qualified to vote in 
local elections one had to be a burgess. Burgesses were per-
sons of "full age who have been resident in or within seven 
miles of the borough during a period of twelve months prece-
ding 15th July, are rated to the poor rate and have paid poor 
and borough rates due by a certain date. ,,34 An alternative 
qualification was to be a ten-pound occupation burgess. In 
both cases, there was a necessary property qualification. 
The result of these laws was to restrict the franchise even 
more s everely than in national elections. Thus, the major 
factor to consider in evaluating local elections was the nature 
of the franchise. Nowhere in the United Kingdom was this 
figure over 20% of the adult population. In 1911, the figures 
were: Leicester, 1 9. 6%; Sheffield, 18. 5%; Manchester, 17.1%; 
Leeds, 19.7%; Bristol, 18.3%; Cardiff, 14.8%; and Swansea, 
16.2%.35 The necessity of keeping these figures in mind when 
analyzing the remarkable results of 1910 to 1914 must be em-
phasized. Despite these low numbers, elections (which were 
held annually at the beginning of NovembellS'~o were fairly vi-
gorouslyf:o(tlght with a turnout of almost 75% of eligib}le voters 
in most municipalities . 
Before evaluating the figures for the period, it is 
appropriate to justify the study of local elections. Despite 
34 The Municipal Yearbook (1913), p·7 · 
35Chris Cook, The Age of Alignment (Toronto : University 
of Toronto Press , 1975), p. 49. 
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the low franchise and peculiarities of municipal government , 
municipal elections did " ... unfold a pattern of' politics".36 
These elections provided the Labour Party the essential oppor-
tunity of creating a habit of voting which was so critical 
in British politics. In examining local politics , the special 
difficulties of the parliamentary situation are avoided and 
the trends identified in the earlier part of this chapter 
are seen in their full significance. With these explanations 
firmly in mind , i t is now possible to evaluate my limited 
data . 
In The Evolution of the Labour Party , Ross McKibbin gives 
the following figures : 
No. of 
Year Lab0ur Candidates Elected Gains Losses Net Gains 
1909 555 122 55 32 -23 
1910 330 113 52 19 33 
1911 3 ~ 7 157 95 17 78 
1912 596 164 63 21 42 
1913 494 196 106 21 85 
12,14 NO CONTESTS HELD DUE TO WAR 
SOURCE: McKibbin, p. 85 and Labour Annual Report-1913. 
What do these figures mean and where do they come from? The 
answers to both of these questions are not given by McKibbin. 
The numbers can be found in the Report of the Labour Party's 
Annual Conference. The major problem with these figures is 
that they do not go back to 1908 which was a disastrous year 
for Labour and Liberal alike. 37 Therefore , the gains made 
36p.J. Waller, from his review of Clarke's Lancashire, 
in English Historical Review 87 (October, 1972), p. 845. 
J7Chris Cook, "Labour and the Downfall of 'l~); ' Liberal-
ism. - ;./: 1906-14", Crisis and Controversy (London: MacMillan 
Press Ltd., 1976),p. 40. 
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in 1909 and 1910 only made up for the losses of that year . 
Another difficulty with these figures is a comparison with 
the only other total figures available in this country. The 
two sources in question are The Times (London) and G.D.H . 
Cole ' s ~ History of the Labour Party from 1914. 
The Times is the most intriguing and deceptive source . 
The paper reports only gains and rather arbitrarily adds any 
other information concerning the contests. The major thing 
to keep in mind about these results is that they were published 
in an extremely Conservative paper which would exaggerate the 
situation anytime the Liberals seemed to be loging strength. 
The complete results are in Appendix B. For the purpose of 
this paper, it is sufficient to note just a few things. 
In 1910 according to The Times, the Liberals gained six-
ty seats, the Unionists gained forty-three, and the Labour 
and Socialist Parties gained thirty-four seats. A gain is 
considered to be the winning of a particular seat that had 
not been won in the previous election three years before. 
These are not net gains. Most of Labour's gains occurred in 
the Northwest and the West Riding. The most remarkable show-
ing was at Manchester where Labour gained six seats. The 
only other information given referred to the composition of 
the West Ham council which showed fifteen Unionists, thirteen 
Socialists, and eight Liberal members . 38 
38The Times, 2 November 1910 . 
In 1911, " the municipal elections showed large Liberal 
and larger Labour successes ... ".39 The total gains were 
Labour and Socialists, 56; Liberals, 52; and Unionists, 39. 
Labour's major successes came in Bradford, 6; Liverpool, 6; 
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Birmingham, 6; Manchester, 2; South Shields, 3; and Leeds, 3. 
Again most"gains occurred in the working class areas of the 
North. The Times sheds even more light on the situation when 
examining the Unionists gains. The Conservatives gained three 
seats in Burnley and had "a majority on the council for the 
first time in the history of the borough. ,,4o Even more signi -
ficantly, it was noted that this occurred because of Labour 
intervention. The Unionists also had council majorities in 
such traditional Liberal strongholds as Bury (Lancashire) 
and Coventry.41 Another interesting phenomenon was the pre-
sence of a fusion party in (Gillingham), consisting of a 
Liberal-Conservative party against Labour. Despite this 
coalition, Labour was able to secure two gains on the counfuil. 
The gains in Liverpool (where there was also a fusion party42) 
and Birmingham were particularly impressive not to mention 
the fact that 1911 marked the first year that Labour gained 
more seats than any other party in the country. 
In 1912, the municipal results showed the following gains: 
Liberal, thirty-six; Unionists, fifty-eight; and Labour and 
39The Annual Register (1911), p. 238. 
40The Times, 2 November 1911. 
41Pelling, GeographY, pp. 190, 253, and 266. 
42The Manchester Guardian, 2 November 1911. 
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Socialists , twenty,.-seven . The most notable Labour gains were 
in Bradford, 4; and Southampton, 2.43 More significant were 
the Unionist gains and where they occurred: Bolton, 2; Burn-
ley, 2; Gillingham, 3; Huddersfield, 2; Leeds, 4; Manchester, 
3; w. Ham, 3; Salford, 2; and Wolverhampton, 2.44 The Con-
servatives largest successes were in working classaareas. 
The Gillingham result shows the effectiveness of fusion : the 
Liberal readiness to move to the political right. 1912 saw 
local elections in London as well. The following councils 
were all in working class areas and reveal the position of 
the parties after 1912 . 
Borough Unionists Lib. Lab. and Soc. 
Deptford 17 1 11 
Islington 54 5 1 
Kensington 52 2 6 
Lambeth 56 2 2 
Poplar 29 2 9 
Woolwich 21 0 12 
SOURCE: The Times (1912). 
Out of all the constituencies, the Liberals held a majority 
on but 3 councils; two of them by only one to three councillors . 
The. totals for London showed Unionists, 1,002; Liberals , 252; 
and Labour and Socialists, 48. 45 
1913 was the culmination of Labour success. "They (resul tsJ 
showed an increase of the Labour stllE?ength" ... "and a consi -
derable loss of Liberal seats to Labour and Socialist candi -




dates. ,,46 The f'ollowing results were reported by The Times: 
Unionists, 52 gains and 51 losses ; Liberals , 34 gains and 40 
losses; and Labour and Socialists , 51 gains and 15 10sses. 47 
The Labour Party had netted more seats than any other party. 
The most stunning successes occurred in Birmingham, 2; Brad-
f'ord, 3; Leeds, 3; Leigh, 2; Hull, 2; Middlesborough, 3; and 
Stockton-on-Tees, 3. Looking at the Unionists' success, the 
results showed the most signif'icant gains to be in Halif'ax, 
2; Oldham, 3; Salf'ord, 2; and York, 4. The victory at York 
gave the Union~s a clear majority af'ter a long period of' 
deadlocks. 
The other sou~ce that looks at loca~ elections is G.D .H. 
Cole ' s work in Histo~ of' the Labour Party f'rom 1914. From 
I.L.P. sources, Cole (Like McKibbin) presents the f'ollowing 
f'igures f'or 1913. "494 Labour and Socialist~' candida tes were 
put f'orward ... Of' these, 196 were elected , giving a gain of' 
106 new seats as against twenty-one seats lost-a net gain of' 
eighty-f'ive seats.,,48 In the same year, 353 Labour candidates 
appeared at the District and Parish Council elections, and 
of' these 196 were successf'ul-a net gain of' sixty-eight seats. 49 
Cole calculates that there must have been about 420 Labour 
representatives sitting on a variety of' municipal councils 
by the outbreak of' World War I.50 
46The Annual Register (1 913 ), p . 224. 
47The Times, 3 November 1913. 
48.G.D.H. Cole, ~ History of' the Labour Party f'rom 1914 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul LTD., 1948), p. 445. 
49Ibid. 50Ibid . , p. 447 . 
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What do these results mean? In a general sense, they 
do show the general growth o£ Labour around the country. Yet , 
without getting more details it is di££icult to say much more. 
Fortunately, Chris Cook has assembled data in his book Crisis 
~nd Controversy. The Manchester Guardian also provides added 
detail on the results . Cook's £ind~will be analyzed £irst , 
£ollowed by a look at the Guardian's results. 
I n his article "Labour and the Downf'all o£ Liberalism", 
Chris Cook asserts that after a period of large Liberal successes 
at the municipal level (1902-05); 
... the period a£ter 1906 had seen the Liberals not 
merely on the de£ensive, but su£fering some severe 
reverses. Thus in 1908, Liberals s~££ered heavy 
losses throughout Lancashire as well as losing con-
trol o£ She££ield, Nottingham, and Leicester in 1908 . 
These were serious de£ections; Leicester had been 
in radical control since 1835; Nottingham £or forty 
years. They were joined by others; in 1909, Coventry 
£ell to the Conservatives £or the £irst time in 
twenty years. In 1911, Burnely was won by the Con-
servatives £or the £irst time in its history. In 
1912, Liberals lo~t control o£ Brad£ord. In 1913, 
the Conservatives wrested Hudders£ield £rom the 
Liberals, the first time they had won control o£ 
this Nonconformist stronghold since the incorpora-
tion o£ the borough in 1868.51 
One would naturallyy try to trace this Liberal decline to the 
rise o£ Labour considering the aggregate results £rom The 
Times and McKibbin. This analysis unfortuaately will not 
hold up under care£ul scrutiny. One problem was the disaster 
o£ 1908 , making the results £rom 1909 to 1914 less absolutely 
signi£icant. Another problem is the patchy and uneven march 
of Labour. In Birmingham , after six gains out of £ourteen 
51Cook, p . 40. 
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candidates in 1911, only one out of seven was successful the 
next year, then four out of seven in 1913. 52 After six gains 
in 1911 at Liverpool, none were successful in November of 1912 . 
Rochdale and Sheffield provide similar parallels . The following 
table provides the most detailed sketch of the position of 
the parties after 1913. 
Town Con Lib Lab Oth 
Norwich 33 25 ""5 -1-
Halifax 20 24 7 
Oldham 14 22 1 
Burnley 28 29 3 
Barrow 18 5 8 
Leeds 34 18 16 
Sheffield 32 30 2 
Northampton 17 14 5 
Coventry 26 16 4 
Nottingham 37 25 2 
Bradford 32 31 20 
Wolverhampton 25 17 3 
Birmingham 87 25 8 
York 24 16 6 
SOURCE: Cook, p. 43. 
This table sheds no light on the hypothesis which has Labour 
ousting the Liberal Party before 1914. In fact, many of 
Labour's successes seem to have come at the expense of the 
Conservatives in many areas. Yet, that should be qualified 
by the realization that a large sector of the working class 
had been traditionally Tory. Cook examined five cities to 
examine the actual course of Labour growth. A brief summary 







Bradford had been an I .L. P. stronghold since the early 
1890s. After 1902, this strength was r eflected in the remar-
52Asa Briggs , Histor~ of Birmingham, 2 vols. (London l 
Oxford University Press, 1952), II:198-99 . 
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kable growth of Labour on the council .53 
Year Con Lib Lab Others 
1905 31 42 10 1 
1906 34 38 11 1 
1908 42 30 10 2 
1912 35 31 17 1 
1211 22 11 20 1 
The following table shows the growth of the Labour vote in 
Bradford . 
Year Con Lib Lab Others 
1905 %.3 34."6 22.0 2.0 
1906 37.8 26·3 26.6 9 · 2 
1907 31·7 31·3 30·5 6 .5 
1908 32·9 32·7 30.0 4 . 5 
1909 29·5 30.2 31.3 9 · 2 
1910 33·0 31.4 35.2 .4 
1911 32.0 33·6 31.0 3 · 5 
1912 32.0 26.0 42.0 
1913 27.2 29·7 43.1 
Indeed the Liberals were losing their support dir ectly to 
the Labour Party. 54 The same kind of growth occurred in 
Bradford ' s sister city of Leeds . 
Year Coth n Lib Lab Others 
1906 21 J1} 9 
1907 28 26 10 
190~' 36 23 4 1 
1909 34 23 6 1 
1910 31 26 6 1 
1911 26 28 10 
1912 34 23 11 
1912 24 18 -16 
The Liberals not only lost seats to Labour but to Conserva-
tives as a result of Labour intervention. In three-cornered 
contests, the Liberals were normally at the bottom of the 
53Reynolds, p. 319 . 
54Cook, p. 46. 
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poll . In Sheffield, Labour fared dismally but this did stop 
the decline of the Liberal Party there before 1914. At Lei -
cester, the Liberals were faring poorly due mainly to poor 
relations with the Labour Party (See Chapter 2 !~ on the by -
election for 1913) . Labour was in fact doing quite well 
since they had the largest number of councillors returned in 
contested elections. 55 Leicester was lost for the first time 
since 1835 and there Lib-Labism had no meaning despite the 
parliamentary situation (i.e. MacDonald). At Nottingham, 
Labour was doing poorly. Yet their challenge to Liberalism 
was such that the Conservatives were in firm control there 
by 1913. Cook also notes that Manchester was in Conservative 
hands throughout the period. 
The Manchester Guardian gives fairly detailed municipal 
election results for these years. Clarke ' s argument does 
not hold up for Lancashire at the local level. O~her than 
Wigan, Wakefield, Oldham, and Manchester (and there only from 
1909 to 1911), Conservative-Liberal fusion was more the trend 
than progressivism. There were fusion parties in Liverpool , 
Halifax, Huddersfield, and Barrow. In 1908 at Manchester, 
a Conservative candidate was successful in attracting Liberal 
votes by running as an Independent against Labour.56 In Barrow, 
Leigh , and Salford, the Liberals were losing elections directly 
to Labour. The following table gives a further view of the 
55Cook, p. 51. 
56The Manchester Guardian, 2 November 1908 . 
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general decline o£ Liberalism in the North . 










































In Barrow and Leigh , Labour was gaining most o£ its seats £rom 
the Liberal Party. The loss of Leigh in 1912 was significant 
as it was the only safe Liberal seat in Northeast Lancashire. 57 
Indeed, it was the first time that the Liberals had lost Leigh 
in 13 years. 58 The precipitous deeay of Liberalism in Halifax 
and Barrow was also significant. The small town of Nelson 
was a special case being the only council with an actual 
Labour majority (despite Lib-Con fusion) in the area.59 The 
Chesire division o£ Macclesfield witnessed a steady growth 
in Labour representation despite joint opposition by the 
Tories and a conservative Liberal Party. Between 1910 and 
1912, 5 gains were reported there. Southampton and Bedford 
are further examples of Labour expansion at the expense of 
Liberalism. 60 
57pelling, Geography, pp . 267-68 . 
58The Manchester Guardian, 3 November 1913 . 
59Ibid., 2 November 1912. 
60The Times, 4 November 1913 , p . 5 · 
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The importance of the by-election results are m.:a;glified 
locally. In Wigan and Wakefield, a Lib-Lab alliance continued 
with marked success supporting Clarke's argument. From 1908 
to 1913 in Wigan, the Liberal and Labour Parties had joined 
in stunning successes, wresting the council from the Conser-
vatives for the first time in many years. 61 But for the most 
part, the tensions nationally were translated · to the local 
level. The most remarkable phenomenon was the growth of 
fusion parties. The Liberal Party was evidently faring so 
poorly as to prefer a coalition with the Tories. This impl ned 
that the Liberals were not willing to work out locally a 
policy of accommodation that the leaders of the national party 
had forged. The following is a partial list of those boroughs 
where these fusion parties existed at one or more elections. 






















Guardian, and Waller. 
The growth of fusions seems to suggest that the "New Liberal-
ism" had not been transferred to the const?t~ncy and local 
level. Further evidence for this conclusion can be drawn 
from the rise in three-cornered contests in relatively strong 
progressive areas. 1909 to 1911 marked the heyday of Manchester 
61 The Manchester Guardian, 3 November 191J . 
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progressivism . After that period, there was at least one 
three-cornered contest in that city until the war. Oldham 
also saw an increase in triangular elections. 62 With this 
evidence as a stepping-stone , it easy to hypothesize respec-
ting other Liberal problems . 63 
The organizational problem alluded to earlier seems to 
be borne out by Cook's findings. In many areas (Leicester 
for one), there was tremendous confusion between local Liberal 
64 parties and the N.L.F. The Liberals were without a programme 
and without efficient machinery. 65 One of the significant 
statistics which Cook has uncovered was the age and occupa-
tion of municipal candidates. The Liberals were consistently 
older than Labour candidates and for the most part from middle 
and upper class ranks. 66* Leeds and Wolverhampton were two 
examples of towns where Liberals refused to field working 
class candidates. 67 
62Cook, p. 42. 
63It is interesting to note Cook ' s local findings for 
the post-war era in The Age of Alignment. Labour successes 
and Liberal failures were of course stimulated exponentially 
by the war. Yet, the areas which had shown vulnerability be-
fore 1914 were the same as those which witnessed large Labour 
gains and larger Liberal misfortunes in the early 1920s. 
64Emy , p. 285 . and Cook, p. 62. 
65Ibid . 
66Cook , p. 61 . 
*An interesting comparison to this local figure can be 
found in Barbara Tuchman's The Proud Tower (New York: The Mac -
Millan Company, 1962). On page 369, she claims that of the 
377 M.Ps elected for the Liberals in 1906, "154 .. were busi-
nessmen, 85 were barristers, 69 were Gentlemen, 25 were wri-
ters ... , 22 were officers and the remaining 22 included uni-
versity professors, teachers, doctors and champions of causes ." 
67Cook, p . 61 . 
j) 
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The proposition that the Liberal Party was in a difficult 
position because of the awkwardness of retaining their middle 
class support while appealing to the working class can also 
be tested at the local level. Considering the disastrous 
state of Liberal municipal politics, the marked revival of 
Conservatism in these areas, the growth of fusion parties, the 
patchy growth of Labour, and most importantly the low fran -
chise figure, it is possible to say that large segments of 
the Liberal Party had defected to the Conservative camp by 
1914. 6,fJ:: This conclusion interestingly substantiates Butler 
and Stokes's findings in Political, ,Change in Britain. They 
attempted to find out where most Liberal support had gone 
after 1930 and the death of the party as a political force. 
It was significant that the vast majority of support had gone 
to the Conservative and not the Labour Party. In fact, the 
flow of support from the Liberal Party was predominantly 
middle-class. 69 Wi th these two facts in mind, " one might con-
sider the possibility of a "Center" Party forming, consisting 
of the Unionists and the right-wing of the Liberal Party. 
This seems to have been occurring at the local level. It is 
therefore possible to explain the decline of Liberalism lo-
cally despite the uneven (and in places dismal ) progress of 
68This is not Cook's conclusion. Cook understates the 
importance of fusion parties and claims that the decline of 
Liberalism was a result of the renascence of muncipal conser-
vatism. Cook reaches this conclusion for many reasons. The 
major one being fear of overstating his remarkable findings. 
69Butler and Stokes, pp . 168-69 . 
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the Labour Party as a result of the low municipal franchise 
figures. Why this was not translated to the national situation 
is explained by the unique constitutional challenges to Li-
beralism before W.W. I. The evidence to support this hypo -
thesis is not sufficient to make a definitive statement. But 
the local studies that have been done (Bradford and Wolver-
hampton) seem to suggest that this conclusion was possible. 
Bradford for example .had long been a Liberal stronghold. But 
with middle-class businessmen in control of the organization, 
cordial relations with Labour seemed doubtful. In fact, the 
fusion party there coupled with the defection of the Illing-
worths strongly points to an electoral realignment occurring 
in Bradford before 1914.70 This was also true of Crewe and 
Macclesfield as well. 71 The examples of Leeds, Nottingham, 
Sheffield, and Leicester provide striking correlations with 
the results of the by-elections of 1911-14. As with the 
parliamentary contests, the Conservatives were making large 
gains because of Labour intervention. 
Conclusion 
Research for this chapter has provided some new and ex-
citing evidence on the fortunes of the Liberal Party before 
1914. Clearly the Liberal Party after 1910 was not as healthy 
an institution as most recent commentators have suggested. 
However, the "inevitablist" camp can not take heart from this 
70Reynolds, p. 319 . 
71The Manchester Guardian, 4 November 1913· 
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study either. For if Liberalism was in decline before 1914 
(as indeed this paper has shown), it was not because the La-
bour Party had superseded it. The Liberal Party was having 
difficulties because of its own inability to adapt to three 
fundamental challenges . 
The primary threat to the Liberal Party was its relation-
ship with the Labour Party. Most Conservative periodicals 
of the period 1910 to 1914 (Annual Register, The Times, and 
Spectator to name a few) claimed the existence of a "Labour 
revolt". There was something of a Labour revolt during this 
period but:, -;-h J c: rebellion was not confined to the Labour Par-
ty. The Liberal Party at the constituency level was not par-
ticularly friendly towards Labour. Containment was the rule 
and many Liberal leaders had no intention of aiding Labour. 
Just before the Hanley and Crewe by-elections of July 1912 , 
Riddell noted in his diary thatl 
It is evident from what Lloyd George said today 
that the fight between the Liberal and Labour Par-
ties is pretty bitter. It is quite clear that the 
Liberals would like to wipe out the Labour Party , 
and that failing this, they are anxious to keep 
it 'in its place' .72 
In discussing the specific by-elections, the great progressive 
minister Lloyd George went on to say that "I would rather 
see the Conservatives get in than the Labour man."7J P.F . 
Clarke's contention that there was a growing harmony between 
the Liberals and Labour in Manchester is not backed up by 
720hris Wrigley, David Lleyd George and the British La-
bour Movement (New York: The Harvester Press-:-i976), p. 41i. 
7Jlbid. 
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the facts. In a letter to the Spectator , it was claimed that 
"The hitherto peaceful relations of Liberalism and Labour in 
Manchester are at an end, and the "split" may show its effects 
in more than one division of the city.,,74 The proof of this 
was the Liberals' decision to bring forward their own candi-
date for E. Manchester to replace the Labour man. "The new 
development is an attempt on the part of Liberalism to ' get 
its own back' .,,75 Though there was no election forthcoming 
to bear this contention out, it was significant that at the 
local level there were two three-cornered contests in 1913. 
Salford and Oldham had triangular contests as well. Clarke 
himself notes disunity in Manchester locally between the 
I.L.P. and Liberal Party.76 The growth of fusion parties is 
of course the final proof of the bitter feelings between 
Liberalism and Labour. Thus . by 1914 the Liberal Party had 
failed to reach a modus vivendi with Labour and the results 
of this destructive poliey were seen in the by-election and 
municipal election results . 
The challenge embodied by Harcourt and Samuel ' s concerns 
after the 1910 elections is more difficult to gauge because 
of the lack of local research done and because of the "whiggish" 
members'care not to bring down the government during the con-
stitutional crises of 1911-14. Yet, the example of Bradford , 
Outhwaite's outburst at Midlothian, and the lack of Liberal 
74Spectator, 30 August 1913 , p . 310. 
75Ibid. 
76Clarke , Lancashire , p. 165 · 
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working class candidates all point to the Liberals ' failure 
to reconcile (if this was even possible) many members of the 
party with the "New Liberalism" . The most striking example 
of this phenomenon occurred at Halifax. This constituency 
had been one of the areas covered by Lib-Lab agreements at 
the parliamentary level. Yet, at the local level, there was 
strangely enough a Conservative-Liberal fusion party.77 The 
"New Liberals " were increasingly becoming the leaders of the 
parliamentary party and their ideology was in the vanguard 
by 1914. Yet , it is not clear whether this new intellectual 
outlook had truly permeated the party. After the loss of 
Leith-Burgs in the by-election of 1914, J.M. Hogge wrote 
Lloyd George that "The older generation of Scotsmen have been 
bred in Radicalism, but there is growing up a large industrial 
element, the component parts of which are for practical pur-
poses unknown to the official party. ,,78 The results of the 
by-elections in Manchester in 1912 point to this unresolved 
dichotomy of the new and old Liberal. By 1914, "the 'New 
Liberalism ', for all of its achievements , had not brought 
into being a new Liberal Party. "39 Much of the Liberal Party 
could agree with Asquith when he said "I do not come here to 
preach a new gospel. The old gospel is good enough for me 
and I believe for you also.,,80 
77The Manchester Guardian, 2 November 1908 . 
78Emy, p. 288. 
79Petter , p. 59. 
80Cross, p. 66. 
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The last challenge to Liberalism was posed by the necessi-
ty of a new style of organization engendered by the new poli -
tical situation in England that began in the period 1900-10 . 
It has been argued that Clarke's claim that the reorganiza-
tion of the Liberal Party in Manchester had occurred under 
the pressure of progressive politics is at best improbable . 
This can be shown by just a brie·f look at the political ma-
chinery of the Labour and Conservative Parties. 
The Labour Party has a ready made organization of 
an almost perfect character in the Trade Unions. 
It deals very largely with everyday facts relevant 
to the lives of its supporters and easily under-
stood by them. Its real work is done, as the work 
of political conversion must be done, not on the 
platform but in the workshop and the home. 81 
The growing coordination between the N.E.C. and local parties 
after 1911 was critical in making the Labour Party a viable 
machine. Yet, it should be equally noted that there was still 
a very vocal minority that rema:ined autonomous and trouble-
some to the N.E.C.. Despite the difficulties of the Conser-
vative Party, t ity too had gone under a period of vigorous 
reorganization. After the ascendancy of Bonar Law as party 
leader in 1911, the Conservatives began the effective linking 
of competing party bodies, local parties, and the Central 
Office. 82 Meanwhile, the Liberals had reorganized their party 
without reorienting their members. 8) 
81 John Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and Baldwin (London: 
Longman, 1978), p . .5.5-.-
82Ibid ., p. 71. 
83It should be mentioned that despite NLF reorganization , 
Cook ' s and Emy's findings claimethat actual centralization 
and cohesion had as yet not taken place other than in parts 
of Lancashire. 
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The Liberal Party of 1914, unbeknownst to its leaders , 
was not yet ready to face the challenges of the new political 
situation of the twentieth century . The Liberals had under-
gone the requisite ideological and structural growth, but had 
as yet not linked this with the actual electoral situation. 
This was by no means an insolubl ee problem. Yet, the lessons 
of local elections showed that if the Liberal Party did not 
adapt to the changing times, its future was questionable . 
The longer the Liberals waited, . the more difficult it would 
be to negotiate a mutually benefi cial pact with Labour. Work -
ing class consciousness would continue to crystallize in the 
form of trade unionism (which increasingly meant support for 
the Labour Party) . The Labour Party's organization would 
grow stronger and more cohesive. Thus, a certain momentum 
would begin to build that wou ld be increasingly difficult 
to check and steer into a progressive alliance. By 1914, 





The Lamps are going out allover Europe; we shall 
not see them lit again in our lifetime. 
(Sir Edward Grey-August 4, 1914 )1 
Oh the war! If it would only cease! 
(Lord Haldane to his mother, January 7 , 1915)2 
World War I contributed to "a process of disintegration 
in the Liberal Party which by 1918 had reduced it to ruins.") 
The War presented an entirely new set of challenges to Liberalism .4 
By 1915, Asquith had been forced to accept a Coalition Govern-
ment including the Conservatives and Labour . Before the war 
had ended, the party had been torn assunder into two rival 
factions. Other than the political ramifications , the war 
sped up many of the new trends that this paper has identified . 
Under the pressures of full mobilization, trade union member-
ship exploded and working class consciousness was stimulated 
exponentially. Thus, to eliminate World War I as a primary 
1Dangerfield, p. 424 . 
2Trevor Wilson, The Downfall of the Liberal Part~ 1914-35 
(Ithaca, H.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 2). 




contributor to the unnaturally precipitous demise of Liberalism 
is indeed foolhardy. 
This study ends with August 4, 1914. To compare ante-
bellum England with its condition in the aftermath of 1918 
yields only differences, not similarities. Thus, to make 
some kind of "inevitablist" argument for the death of the 
Liberal Party is very difficult. 
This paper has attempted to grapple with four major 
historiographical questions. 
1) What was the position of the Liberal Party by 
the outbreak of World War I? 
2 ) How does one justify historical demarcations? 
(i.e. How and why were three chapters in this pa-
per decided upon?) 
3) What kind of change (political or social) can 
be achieved through a given political system? 
4) What is the nature of a period of transition 
and how does it affect the political system? 
Between 188,6 and 1914, England underwent a series of 
important social changes which would alter the entire basis 
of partisan politics. The growth of wor~er consciousness led 
to the polarization of the electoral system. The Conserva-
tives came to stand for wealth and the Labour Party for the 
working man. The Liberal Party was caught somewhere inbetween . 
The Liberals intellectually met the challenge by attempting 
to become the party of the working class. But this was no 
simple task,. The traditional adherents to Liberalism were 
not eager to take on such an ideology nor should it be ex-
pected that they could in such a short period of time. Thus , 
the Liberal Party became something of a political potpourri , 
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a-t-tempting -to retain its traditional middle-class supporters 
while at the same time trying to attract a new working class 
constituency. This would almost certainly lead to internal 
tension. The breakdown o£ Lib-Labism and the results o£ local 
elections are the proo£ o£ this problem. By 1914, the Li-
berals were in a critical situation. They had not resolved 
the internal inconsistencies between policy and rank and £ile 
sentiment. However, World War I inter£ered de."'1'~ the 
Liberals the opportunity o£ resolving this £undamental chal-
lenge. Yet, it must be emphasized that it was not the War 
which initiated the Liberal's problems. As o£ 1914, the Li -
berals were already experiencing serious di££iculties and 
decay . 
I t is a di££icult yet necessary task to divide history 
into sections. The divisinns this paper has made seem to be 
the most help£ul in evaluating the £irst £ourteen years o£ 
the twentieth century in England. The most conspicuous £ea-
ture o£ these years was the great social upheaval within the 
working class (chapter I ). This is a political paper and it 
has there£ore been necessary to see what the tangible e££ect 
o£ social upheaval was on the political system . Thus, an 
examination o£ the Labour Party was necessary ( chapter II) . 
The £inal chapter attempted to describe the actual (both £rom 
the "perspective o£ 1914 and with the bene£it o£ 20:20 hind-
sight) political situation by 1914. Certain conclusions can 
now be made by examining these three chapters as a unit. 
Attempting to link the growth o£ working class conscious-
125 
ness with the growth of the Labour Party is at best problem-
atic. However, there are certain relationships between the 
two which are important to understand . The uniqueness of 
the working class movement in England was a very important 
factor in the shaping of a "Labour Party". Defined by forces 
peculiar to England, the new worker did not consider himself 
a Marxist or revolutionary Syndicalist. While adopting these 
movements ' tactics, the worker steadfastly refused to embrace 
their creeds and names. Instead, the worker took refuge in 
trade unionism. This type of practical and traditional action 
was of no small importance for the Labour Party. It was not 
accidental that such groups as the S.D.F. and Fabians were 
excluded from any control of the party soon after its forma-
tion in 1900. It was also not an accident that Lloyd George ' s 
plea for national unity during the Agadir Crisis succeeded . 
By July 1914, many people felt that a "General Strike" was 
imminent. Yet, with the outbreak of war, the vast majority 
of the working class readily traded in their picket signs for 
gr.lns. The I.L.P. had formed a working class coalition with 
the knowledge that it was the vast and as yet untapped force 
of conservative trade unionists which would make or break 
the fortunes of an independent political Labour Party. Though 
the N.E.C. resisted direct control by the T.U.C., it was the 
growing harmony between the two bodies which was the most im-
portant feature of the pre-war party. It was also not a coin-
cidence that the N. E.C . developed" a political organization 
that was based on the trade unions. The most important influ-
ences on the Labour Party were those that affected trade 
unionism (e.g. Taff Vale, Osborne Judgement, and the Trade 
Union Act of 1913). 
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The most pressing demands of the English working class 
movement were very concrete and specific. The Labour Party ' s 
programme from 1906 to 1914 was also very narrowly defined. 
More idealistic leaders such as Hardie, Hyndman, and Tillett 
held little influence in the party by 1914. There is little 
doubt that the great bulk of the labour movement held the 
views espoused by trade unionism . Thus, the Labour Party 
only became more radical as the rank a nd file became more 
radical. MacDonald moved the N.E . C. slowly until after the 
strikes and political ruptures in the minmng constituencies 
of 1911-14 seemed to suggest that the party as a whole was 
ready for stronger political action. Thus, the N.E.C. fi -
nally relented in allowing more three-cornered contests. 
The constraints of the political system also bore heavily 
on the fortunes of Labour. The nature of the franchise, the 
traditions of political voting habits, and the constitutional 
crises of the day were all serious obstacles to an unfettered 
growth of Labour power . The pact of 1903 is the best example 
of the need for compromise in order to break into a highly 
structured system. It was not easy to overcome as pervasive 
a force as Lib-Labism. Yet, the Labour Party could grow only 
as fast as certain traditions were lost. This naturally leads 
to an examination of the position and actions of a highly 
confusing and contradictory Liberal Party . 
J 
12 7 
The Liberal Party had all of the advantages of a well -
established institution. Yet, because of the confusion in 
aspirations between the leaders and rank and file of the party, 
much of this advantage had been lost by 1914. The decision 
by the party to allow Labour to grow virtually without challenge 
from 1901 to 1910 must be viewed as a grave and decisive error. 
C----., By letting Labour occupy certain areas, a habit was allowed 
.~ to form. This momentum was translated into organization and 
fueled by a heightened working class consciousness. Labour 
was by no means a mere interest group by 1914. Yet it was 
treated as such by the Liberal Party. The lessons of the 
by-elections and local elections between 1910 and 1914 all 
revealed the serious repercussions of this foolish and con-
tradictory policy. A possible 1914 or 1915 General Election 
would have to be fought on funaamentally different grounds 
for the Liberals not to be swamped because of three-cornered 
contests. Ideological differences were unimportant; even if 
they existed. It is easy to make these observations in 1980. 
We can look back at the situation of 1914 free from the diffi -
culties and myopias of those years. From the perspective of 
1914, it is difficult to imagine the Liberals formulating 
new strategies with regard to Labour considering the exigencies 
of the era. But it is only possible to gain a clear view of 
the electoral situation of the time by juxtaposing these three 
chapters. 
A much larger and general historical question concerns 
the amount of change that can be accomplished through a poli -
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tical system. The period this paper examines is an excellent 
case study for gaining an insight into this question. 
The initial force for change comes from outside the poli -
tical system. This is the force of rising class conscious-
ness which begins as a very unwieldy, nebulous, and unfocused 
impetus. Immediately, this impetus encounters a series of 
filters which begin a process which will narrow the force's 
scope. In the case of workers' consciousness, the initial 
filter is embodied in the traditions and customs of Britain 
(Chapter I, section ii). The next step in this process is 
the finding of a sNitable outlet in which the now narrowed 
consciousness can become visible. Trade unionism was that 
object. 
By residing in the union movement, working class conscious -
ness was Qncumbered by yet a further set of contraints. These 
filters included such things as institutional constraints 
(e.g. union procedu~es) and the very fact that this force 
was working through an established process. The next filter 
is the most critical and most difficult to penetrate. It is 
the actual entrance into the political arena. That working 
class consciousness was able to penetrate the political sys-
tem reveals the enormous strength and importance of the move-
ment. Yet, once within the political forum, the initial impe -
tus is even more severely defined. 
All of the constraints inherent in the system serve to 
prevent any cataclysm (despite the cataclysm the force can and 
did exhibit at times) from occurring. The nature of the 
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£ranchise, the two party system, and many other £eatures o£ 
British politics limit the amount o£ change that can be achieved 
through the system. Once one adds such constraints as the 
issues o£ the day ( e .g . constitutional crises),the actions 
o£ political actors (e . g . the actions o£ the Liberals), and 
other external obstacles ( Ta££ Vale, Osborne, etc.), the 
amount o£ potential £or change is admittedly very small in 
a short space o£ time. By 1914, what remains are certain 
trends and patterns o£ disenchantment which reveal themselves 
in such ways as rank and £ile unrest ( Keighl~, Leicester ) 
and municipal election results. The di££iculty in Lib-Lab 
relations is the most salient o£ these patterns and the most 
important £or the period this paper deals with. Thus, poli-
tical change is tempered by a vast array o£ di££erent £orces 
and £ilters. The entire process (unless interrupted by some-
thing as momentous as the First World War) is a very slow one 
and becomes more de£ined by negative obstacles cast in its 
path than by the original ambiguous impetus. That anything 
of the original working class consciousness remained and had 
pro£ound in£luence on the political system by 1914 attests 
to its overwhelming strength and vitality. 
It is time to return to the hypothesis originally pro -
pounded in the Introduction to this. paper. It is critical 
that 1910 to 1914 be understood as a period o£ transition. 
The essential quality o£ a period o£ transition-which actually 
de£ines it as such a period-is the interaction between the 
old and the new. In order to elucidate this point, it is 
) 
important to examine each chapter and identify these points 
of tension. 
The crux of chapter I was its emphasis on an entirely 
1)0 
new set of trends which began to permeate and profoundly affect 
the working class. These new forces included the growth of 
education, the reduction in the work week, and the new develop -
ments in communication. The most important old force was 
the working class tradition in England. Pride in England and 
pragmatic vision were the hallmarks of this tradition. Ano -
ther important old problem was the economy. There had of 
course been periods of inflation before. That this phenome-
non reoccurred at the same time that these newer forces began 
to affect the working class was critical in defining what 
types of demands would be formulated by the newly aroused 
consciousness of the British worker. 
The trade union movement offers another set of compari -
sons between the old and new. Trade unionism itself was 
certainly not a new force; hence, the "New Unionism". Be-
tween 1890 and 1914, there was an on-going battle between 
the new unions and old unions for supremacy in the T.u.c.5 
Inherent in both of these confrontations was a question of 
issues. The new unions stressed demands of union recogni-
tion, working only with union men, intra-union association, 
political action, and a quest for a minimum wage. Yet, the 
traditional purposes of unionism remained strong. Safety 
5See the Webbs' Histone of British Trade Unionism. 
) 
regulation, prevention of wage cuts, and craft and union 
integrity all continued to be important forces up to 1914. 
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The Labour Party itself was a new entity. Yet, externally 
and internally it too experienced the tension of old and new. 
External to the party were such old considerations as the 
constraints of the system and traditional political percep-
tions of the electorate. Yet, these older questions were 
now being challenged in a very significant way by the new 
and powerful effect of political unionism and heightened 
working class consciousness. Within the party, the clearest 
example of old and new can be seen in the struggles over lea-
dership o£ the N.E.C. On one side were such veterans as 
Hardie and Hyndman seeking control. On the other, werereac-
tionary Lib-Labers like Bell and Burns. In the end, a com-
promise was reached with the ascendancy of men such as Mac-
Donald and Henderson to the leadership. The struggle over 
control and coherence (see Chapter II) are examples of how 
these tensions were translated to the operational level. 
In the Liberal Party, the problemo£ transition was most 
acutely felt. The New Liberal versus the Old Liberal was 
the critical con£rontation for the future of the party and 
electoral system (as it was then constituteg). The manner 
in which this dichotomy was solved would dictate whether the 
party would remain a signi£icant force in politics. In Chap-
ter III, three problems were identified as trouble spots for 
the Liberals. The dif£iculties in organization were not new. 
The struggle between autonomous, fragmented organization and 
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centralization was an important f'eature of' these years. Cen-
tralization was beginning to prevail by 1914. The problem 
of' compositional stress (middle-class against working class ) 
was also not new . Yet, in degree, the movement to the lef't 
""'~ by Liberalism wasAradically dif'f'erent than ever bef'ore . The 
leaders and thinkers of' the party had within f'our years l ef't 
the basic tenets of' nineteenth century Liberalism smoldering 
in thexr grave. Was the party as a whole ready f'or such a 
rapid change? If' the decay of' Lib-Labism in the constitu-
encies has any signif'icance, it appears not . The problems 
between the Liberal and Labour Parties were of' course not 
completely due to the old versus ne.w tensions .mDJ~nmanw , ways, 
these problems-especially f'rom the Labour point of' view-were 
more practical (e.g. f'ielding working class candidates ). Yet, 
the critical question was whether the Liberal Party, not 
merely its elite, had changed? Given Lib-Lab tensions and 
municipal election results, it is apparent that the old against 
new tension had not been resolved. 
The tensions engendered by a period of' transition do not 
all occur in the same way. Sometimes ihhe old and new will 
conf'ront one another (as within the Liberal Party ). At other 
times, the old and new will interact in such a way as to 
sharpen and def'inethe new (e.g. the ef'f'ect of' unionism and 
British tradition on a heightened working class consciousness ). 
Admittedly, this interpretation yields many ambiguities . In 
describing the Liberal Party, Dangerf'ield labeled it as an 
"Animula Vagula" . Def'initions are always imprecise. In a 
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period of transition , history is vague : Historia Vagula . 
There are no definitive answers . In a sense , this entire 
paper has attempted to trace several process problems. Thus, 
the period 1910 to 1914 should be considered as a series of 
transitional tensions which attempted to work themselves out . 
However, after 1914, the political system "was involved in 
an encounter with a rampant omnibus (the First World War ), 
which mounted the pavement and ran ( it ) over .,, 6 
6Wi lson , p . 18 . 
APPENDIX A 
ECONOMICS 
The purpose of this appendix is to examine the economic 
condition of the wage-earner in England in the years 1900-14 . 
The three measurements that will be examined are nominal wa-
ges , real wages, and prices. Of course these three measure-
ments are dependent upon one another. But it is most convenient 
and helpful to examine them individually. The major sources 
used are A. L. Bowley's Wages and Income in the United Kingdom 
Since 1860 , the Board of Trade Labour Gazette, and the most 
recent study found in ~e Cambridge Economic History of Europe , 
vol. 7, part I. Two clarifications should be made before 
proceeding wi th the examination. 
The question why certain sources are used and others 
excluded is important . Bowley's work is used because almost 
all "wage statistics for the pre-1914 years are based "l on his 
work. The Gazette is used for several reasons. Its statis-
tics were the numbers that the government used in assessing 
the economic condition of the country. The Gazette was pub-
lished every month and thus from an historical standpoint , 
l SidneyPollard, "Labour in Great Britain", The .. Cambridge 
Economic History of Europe, vol . VII, part I (London: C.U.P, 
1978), p. 165. -
134 
135 
reveals the perceptions of mos t people of the time. It is 
therefore invaluable as a source for a paper on political 
perceptions. Pollard's work is used as it is the most modern, 
most eclectic , and presumably most accurate work to date. 
The second problem is the difficulty in providing accurate 
measurements for the period in question. Many industries 
had no systematic method of reporting wage-changes. Many 
industries are simply missing. Thus, this study will examine 
changes from year to year and compare these changes to pre-
vious years. 
The index of the nominal wage is tabulated from figures 
reported by trade unions and employers, and these only when 
they are compiled uniformly and, relate to morethan one date. 
The major problem is the question of changing relative numbers. ' 
This refers to a problem of composition. Just examining the 
general change in the nominal wage is misleading. The prob-
lem arises from the fact that different industries have more 
people than others. Thus, the Coal Mini ng Industry might 
report a 102,17 5 pound:llSi~ in wages a week for 978 ,000 people 
compared to the year before. Th~s rise might account for 
over 75% of the complete rise in wages for the entire country. . 
This obviously does not help assess how Eggland as a whole 
was doing as far as nominal wages were concerned. Bowley has 
devised an equation for this problem taking into account all 
of these factors (See A) . 
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1910 - 130 
1911 - 131 
1912 - 135 
1913-137 
1914-118 
1880 was the first year Bowley examined, and he used it as 
his base year (i.e.~100). Until 1900, there was a gradual 
rise from 100 to 130. After 1900, the changes in wages were 
uneven. 1900-05 was a period of decline . 1905-07 was a period 
of recovery to the previous wage levels. 1908-11 was a period 
of general stagnation . The year 1912 was fairly prosperous 
as compared with 1911 mainly due to the Miners Minimum Wage 
Act. Thus , the general change in wages from 1900-14 was an 
uneven rise of 8 po i nts. The Labour Gazette's appraisal for 
1911 can be generalized for the whole period. There was a 
"slight upward movement in wages ... but did not become at 
any time very marked." To clarify this examination of nomi -
nal wages further it is helpful to lc}ok at the wages for spe-
cific industries both in Bowley and the Labour Gazette . 
Bowley reports the following figures. 
Year Agricultural Coal ___ Building Shi:Qbuilding Cotton 
1900 109 163 115 109 ---r2T 
1901 110 153 115 110 124 1902 110 142 115 110 23 
1903 110 138 115 110 123 
1904 110 134 11 5 110 124 
1905 110 132 115 110 127 
1906 110 136 115 110 132 
1907 110 157 115 110 n 
1908 110 152 115 110 0 
1909 110 145 115 110 .. ~;' data 
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Year Agricultural Coal Building Shipbuilding Cotton 
1910 110 . ~ 115 - - 110 - no 
1911 112 144 115 112 
1912 114 152 116 114 data 
1913 118 1 63 119 118 
1914 122* 160 123* 122~ 
*NOTE: 1914 is an anomaly because of the impact of the war. 
The ; first six months actually revealed a mild depression~jj 
But this was totally negated by the inflation the war caused. 
In both Bowley and the Gazette, the numbers (See B) revealed 
several trends . The Coal Mining industry had a very large 
effect on the course of the nominal wage. Most other indus -
tries had relatively stable wages to 1910 and then a rise of 
only a few points occurred before the war. Hence, the course 
of the nominal wage was fairly similar to the course of wages 
in the coal industry. The first decade of the twentieth cen-
tury can basically be seen as a struggle to regain the levels 
reached in 1900. 1 910-14 can be construed as a period of 
modest gains in the average wage as the 1900 level was fi -
l"lally eclipsed. 
The nominal wage alone only reveals that wages were not 
impro;ging very much. It is even more helpful to compare this 
figure with the cost of living. The cost of living (or course 
of prices) is tabulated by indexing which requires the tech-
nique of weighting. Bowley established a certainnbudget of 
expenditures and evaluated its cost year by year. The items 
in this budget included food, rent, fuel, clothing, and sun-
dries. The foll~~ing table is Bowley's account of the course 
of the cost of living as compared with wages. Column 1 was 
converted from the nominal wage into similar terms of the 
cost of living index to afford some basis of comparison. 
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Column 3 is the real wage which is found by dividing Column 1 
by Column 2. 
Year Wages Cost of Living Quotient 
1900 94 91 103 
1901 93 90 102 
1902 91 90 101 
1903 91 91 99 
1904 89 92 97 
1905 89 92 97 
1906 91 93 98 
1907 96 95 101 
1908 94 93 101 
1909 94 94 100 
1910 94 96 98 
1911 95 97 97 
1912 98 100 97 
1913 99 102 97 
12,14 100 100 100~ 
The following table is from the Gazet,1e and examines the course 
of the retail price of food. 23 articles are indexed and 

















More specifically, the retail price of bread rose 16 . 2% from 
1900 . The price of meat rose 21% . Dairy goods rose about 
An ar1'lysis of the preceding data reveals a general steady 
rise in the cost of living and the price of food from 1900-14. 
At times, these prices rose sharply (food-1911-12). Other 
than the years 1907-09 which saw a depression, the cost of 
Ii ving was highslF7:' than the nominal wage . Real wages fell 
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throughout most of' the period and the best they ever did was 
to achieve a degree of' stability af'ter 1911. 
One f'inal question to ask of' the economic statistics is 
what was the wage-earner ' s share in the total G.N.P? Keynes , 
Bowley, and Pollard were all struck by the stability of' this 
relationship. For over 40 years, the wage-earner who made 
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This table shows a declining percentage of' the workf'orce earn-
ing a consistent percentage of' the G.N:iP. Thus, it would seem 
that the wage-earner was actually improving his position . 
But this is misleading. These are aggregative f'igures which 
obscure certain distributive anomalies (e.g. skilled and 
white collar workers were improving their position) within 
the wage sector. Yet, the most misleading aspect of' this table 
is the simple f'act that there was tremendous mnequality evident . 
Three-f'ourths of' the workforce was earning only two-f'if'ths of' 
the G. N7P(i.e. 25% of' the population earned 60% of' the G.N.P.). 
There is a gradual improvement but nothing signif'icant when 
one examines each industry . 
This study's purpose has been to establish that the period 
J 
1900 to 1914 for the worker , was at best , one of stagnation . 
Nominal wages fought throughout the entire period to regain 
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the levels of 1900. Meanwhile, prices were fairly consistently 
rising throughout the period. An even more important consi-
deration is not these general macro-economic trends. In the 
study of trade union growth, the three most important groups 
which served as catalysts for the growth in the T.U.C . were 
the miners, railwaymen, and the unskilled transport workers . 
The miners plight is fairly well illustrated in the statis-
tics with w~ges not recovering to their 1900 level until 1913 . 
The railwaymen and transport workers' numbers are not inclu-
ded. Both these groups suffered from severely depressed 
wages and conditions. The effect of rising prices was most 
acutely felt in these quarters. In conclusion, wage stagna-
tion was felt and perceive d by most wage~earners in the face 
of rising prices. It is important to note that the fifteen 
years before the period in question were marked py rising no -
minal wages and falling prices. Thus, the worker of the 
early twentieth century was quite unaccustomed to the phe~ 
nomenon of wages lagging behind prices. This is apparent 
from almost all of the literature of the period (see espe-
cially Askwith). Fit into a framework of a "more educated 
worker with more leisure time to think and read political, 
socialist;, and industrial propaganda, some causal relation-
ship can be seen for the subsequent growth of trade unions and 
in turn the Labour Party . In particular, the plight of the 
workers in the three major industries of the period was most 
severe . This led to organization and disputes in the period 
after 1910. All of these men (RR, coal, transport) were part 
of industries integrally connected with Britain's economy 
and their efforts to enhance their positions were directly 
felt by the entire country. Thus, even if the aggregate 
totals are not very revealing and make pro j ections tenuous , 
the ~~cific numbers of these other industries are clearly 
bad enough to point to political action and growth . 














106 WAGE CENSUSES 
statistics in Appendix E. But in 1931 and in 1935 the earlier pro-
portion was restored, owing' to the fact that women suffered less 
from unemployment than did men. 
The effect of various hypotheses is shown in the following little 
table. There it is seen that very little depends for the final index on 
these proportions of agriculturists to other males, or of females to 
males. . 
Average earnings (in shillings) 
Males 1906 1924 193 1 1935 
Actual earnings 
Industry (Table XI) 27"0 57"6 55'7 56'9 
Agriculture (p. 113)' 16'7 28'7 31'9 32,' ) 
Combined 
Proportion 8: 1 25'9 54'4 53'1 54"2 
" 
II: I 26'2 55'2 53'7 54'9 
Adopted 25'9 54'4 53'7 54"7 
Males 25'9 54"4 53"7 54'7 
Females (Table XI) II'8 27'5 26'9 27"3 
Combined . 
<t!ll 
Proportion 7=3 21"8 46'3 45"7 46'5 (0) 
" 
72: 28 in 1924 46'9 - (f,) 
Index-numbers 100 981 100 (a) 
100 97 99 (6) 
Index on p. 19 100 97 95 
Thus it is clear that in 1935 the index obtained from actual 
earnings reads higher than tl:iat from wage-rates as on p. 30. 
This is the justification. for modifying the latter as is there done. 
I The figures of Table XI are reduced 9 per cent. to include boys. 
-r zagl" ,.,- c::rrrrmrrfFWJVJJfi'!'ftjJj,·"#,, 'K "2£"-," 1' . " :gie"'"' ' ,:;; r 
Appendix B 
NOTES ON SEPARATION OF THE FACTORS 
MAKING FOR CHANGES IN AVERAGE WAGES 
The change of average wages of the whole working class over any 
period depends partly on the increase or decrease in the rates for a 
normal week, partly on the amount of unemployment, short-time 
and over-time, partly on changes from time- to piece-rates, and 
finally on the shifting of the relative numbers between occupations 
within an industry, and tlle shifting from industry to industry. 
(Memorandum of the London and Camhridge Economic Service, No. 28, 
p. 2. (ref. 42).) Of these factors, total unemployment is allowed for 
in computations of the National Wage-Bill in Chapter v. The 
changes within each industry are dealt with above in the working 
up of the Wage Censuses, where the averages for whole industries 
are taken, with a double reckoning for earnings in normal hours 
and actual earnings. There remains the factor of the influence of 
relative changes of the numbers in the whole industries. The 
analysis given in the following pages is based on 'Notes on Index 
Numbers', EconomicJournal, 1928, pp. 235-'7 (ref. 25). Here it is 
applied to the successive Wage Censuses . 
Notation. 
Number of persons in each of m industries or occupations: 
at first date N , ... Nt '" N,n, 
at second date nI ••• nt '" n,,,. 
Average wages of these persons: 
at first date WI'" Wz ... Wm , 
at second date WI'" W t ••• wm• 
Average wage in all industries: 
atfirst date W = (W,N, + ... + WzNt + ... + WmNm) 
-;- (NI + ... + Nt + ... + Nm) 
= SeWN) -;- mN, 
where N is the average number in an industry ; 
at second date iii = S (wn) -;- mn. 
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Forward measurement of change in average wages, the relative 
numbers in industries being as at first date: 
RI = (wINI + ... + wtN, + ... + wmNm) 
-:- (WIN, + ... + W,Nt + ... + WmNm) 
, = S (wN) -:- S (WN). 
Backward measurement of change, the relative numbers being as 
at the second date: 
Rz = S (wn) -:- S (Wn). 
Increase of average wage: 
where 
1= w -:- JP' = Rz x PI = RI X P z, 
PI = S(JPn) -:- SeWN) = SeWn) and P
z 
= Sewn) -:- SewN). 
Sen) SeN) mWn Sen) SeN) 
Then PI or P z measures the chflnge in the average due to the 




nt = N' Nt + Y" W, = W + {" 
so that x, Y and { measure the variation of w, n or W from their 
averages or weighted averages. 
Then , S (x,Nt) = 0, S (Yt) = 0, S ((tNt) = 0. 
It follows that 
R _ R _ Sewn) - RI.S(Wn) _ S{(RI W,+xt)nt} - R .. S(Wtn,) 
2. , - SeWn) - SeWn) 
S 
S {XI (n Nt + YI)} 
(Xtnt) N 
= SeWn) = S (Wn) 
S (XtYt) , S N) I M (XI YI) = S ( TY/
n
) , smce(Xt t = 0, = - x ean =:0. - • 
Wj PI W n 
Therefore R z > RI if increase in numbers is correlated with in-
crease of wages in excess of RI • 
If Rz = RI there is no net gain or loss by transference to rising or ' 
falling wages. 
FACTORS OF CHANGES IN AVERAGES 
Also _ S {{t (n Nt + Yt)} 
PI = S (W,nt) = S {(W + (t) nt} = I + _--:N=-__ _ 
W. S (nt) WS (n,) WS (nt) 
= I + S ({tYt) , since S ('(I Nt) = 0, 
WS(n,) 
= I + Mean (il .~). , W ii 
Hence PI> I, if {t and Yt are positively correlated, that is if an 
increase in relative numbers is associated with high wages at the 
first date. 
Similarly P" ,= I + ~i Mean I ;,.. ~ I, where Wt = W + Vt, 
so that S (Vtn,) =0. Pz >' I if an increase in relative numbers is 
associated with high wages at the second rate. 
With the help of these formulae we can obtain rough indications 
of the influence of the shifting of numbers on the general average 
over several periods. 




Average money wages 
Allowing 











Taking the second column as I and the third as Rn we have 
I RI Pz 
1850-J880 1'47 1')1 1'12 
1880-J910 1'265 1'15 1'10 
J850-19JO 1'86 I'SI 1'23 
Using the index 100: 130 for I 1880-1910, as on p. 6 above, 
we have Pz = 1'13 for that period. Thus approximately half of the 
increase in average earnings is due to movement to higher wages, 
half to movement towards rising wages. 
I Journal of the Royal Statistical Socie~y, 1909, pp. 102.-], brought to a 










The Board of Trade Labour Gazette, (1911,1915) 
Group of Trades. 
Co.I )f1ninj! .. 
Iron. l\:.e., lIinfng 
Quorryinj!.. •• .. 
l)i~ Iron lhnufnrture .. 
Iron mud 8t~cl.Ma.Dufacture 
B 
Number of Work-
poople" who,e rates 
of ,rages "'ere 








1~,717 11,94 ~ 
18,001 18,047 . 
f6,631 ~8,B34 
, Net amouot of 
. Ille. (+ I or De". (-) 
I io the weekly 
I wages of those I affected, as com· 
I pared with the pre· 
! ceding year •• 
1913. 1914. 
-£,- --£,-
+102,175 - 2F,785 
+ 2,004 - 2,135 
+ 1,184 + I,O~Ot 
+ ~l - 1,438 
+ ) ,854 - 3,475 
Total for trndes In "hieh wages 
deClined In 19U. 
),09(1,780 418,7~9! +107,298 - 32,793 
nUilding.. .. .. .. 
Engineering and ShiI,buildlng 
Othtr Metal I rndes .. •• 
Te~t!le Trades •• 
Clothill!; Trades.. •• 
Transport Trades 
. Printing, &c., Il'ades 
Glass, &0., Trades 
Other Trades . . • • . • 
Employees of Local Authorities 
i 
-189.87Il2.8:59si + 23,165 + 12,921 
224,832 Iffl,66'l I + 1 .~,521 + P,594 
. 38,197 23,8"5 :1 + ",755 + 1,471 
14~,,;s1 I 21,?23/ + 9,640 + 1,288 
19,810 S,591 + 2,709 + 614 
49,236 I :>3,886 + f',329 + 4,843 
)2,782 I 17,651 I + ],009 + 1,417 
2fo,On 13.653 ',1 + 2,012 + 1,046 
40,927 26,168, + 4,439 + 3,097 
33,193 18,131 II + 2,603 + 1,564 
ToW for I·rades in whiCh wages 




G,'oups of Trades. 
]lllilding .... 
('oal ~li1Jlng .... .. •• 
Iron, &c., .lIining .• . . 
Qn:trryh'g .• .. .. 
}Ji~ Iron llanufa\.'(.urc " 
lrull alld Sted ).lanufadure 
J'J1I~i"ecrillg ao(l Shipbuilding 
Other )1 r·tal Trades .. .. 
T~xLile Trod"".. .. .. 
Clothing Trades .• " 
]·rjnUng, &c I Trades . . 
Glass, &c., 'trade.1J .• .. 
Transport Trades I •• •• 
Otbtr 'l:!·adcs.. .. .. 
E11ll,ll}yets of I.ocnl Authorities 
Total 
1,867,991 I 834,240 11+171',480 +5,062 
._._, Xet Amouut ::;-_. 
. Incl'""sa (+) 01' 
Numh",. of I Jlec,.cae~ (_) in 
\\'ol'l<pe"I>IC w1Iooc i tIle Weekly "",,,fa (,I 
rate {, W:lgcS I tho~e n2fcctei.l aa 
were chauc;r:d iu l Comlnrctl· wi' h "lhe. I pr"ce~in;; ye.1r • 
.. --__ ~--_-- II--_-----------
1910. I 1911. * I ·1910. I 0 1911· • 
.. I 4,970 14,622 I + If. 377 + 1.378 
. • 383,586 3~,2S6 + 5;488 - (I,ll55 
_. 10,512 10,503 + 41$ - 3~ 
.. 5 £06 'J,9H + 2f.9 + 199 
.. 16:235 IS,Sfu! + 514 - :005 
•. 27,581 40532 + 1.350 + 1,411 
.. 5}i~ 19~,~~,~ t 2;~~~ t 151~~ 
.. 29:220 JE~B56 + 1,.843 ' +- 9.0 
3,H3S 3,On + 200 + 231 
.. 2,979 5,798 + G75 + 593 
.. 1,056 12.250 + 53 · + 1,173 
.. 3,879 77;057 + 3-11 + 12.270 
.. 1,936 16,003 + 232 + 1;312 
.. ] ,401 15,415 I + 86 + 8\!8 




Municipal Election Gains as Reported in The Times , 1910-14. 
November 2, 1910 
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Total == 66 
Birmingham:-1 
Blackburn-l 
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